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When Facts Don’t Matter
Eric Berger ∗
We are used to thinking that facts shape legal outcomes, but
sometimes the Supreme Court wants nothing to do with facts. In some
high-profile constitutional decisions, the Roberts Court has ignored
important congressional findings, deeming irrelevant facts that
document the very mischief Congress sought to remedy. Similarly, in
these same cases the Court exploits the muddy line between facial and
as-applied challenges to avoid confronting particular facts. The Justices
in these cases do not question the veracity of seemingly relevant facts.
Rather, they write their opinions as though these facts don’t matter.
This Article examines the Court’s penchant for brushing aside
inconvenient facts. Using three prominent decisions as case studies, it
argues that a majority of Justices too often rely on novel constitutional
doctrine to dismiss congressional findings and other facts. This collective
disdain for facts muddles constitutional law, aggrandizes the judiciary,
and privileges ideology over evidence. Of course, the relevance of
particular facts is ultimately a legal question, so the Court clearly
enjoys the prerogative to determine which findings have constitutional
salience. That said, the Court still owes Congress and the country a
more careful explanation when it deems irrelevant the very facts that
prompted legislative action in the first place.

∗
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INTRODUCTION
We live in a post-factual world. Prominent political figures,
including the President of the United States, regularly accuse their
opponents of peddling lies. 1 Conservatives and liberals both
routinely characterize inconvenient news stories as “fake.” 2 Our body
politic is bitterly divided, and the disagreement isn’t limited just to
politics and policy. We disagree about facts.
If any public institution in our society is above such partisan
epistemology, one would think it would be the judiciary. Trial courts
follow rules of evidence and discovery procedures, and appellate
courts have various doctrines guiding their approach to different
kinds of facts. 3 Federal judges, moreover, enjoy life tenure, 4 so they
should not be subject to the same political pressures that lead some
politicians to reject inconvenient facts. If facts should matter
anywhere, it is in courts.
1. See Julie Hirschfeld David & Glenn Thrush, Calling Comey a Liar, Trump Says He
Will Testify Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06
/09/us/politics/trump-comey.html?mcubz=3; Katie Zezima, Clinton Accuses Trump of
Spreading ‘Racist Birther Lie’, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/26/clinton-accuses-trump-of-spreading-racist-birthe
r-lie/?utm_term=.50d19d6ccf80.
2. See Danielle Kurtzleben, With ‘Fake News,’ Trump Moves from Alternative Facts to
Alternative Language, NPR (Feb. 17, 2017, 8:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/17/
515630467/with-fake-news-trump-moves-from-alternative-facts-to-alternative-language; John
Siciliano, Climate Skeptics Slam New York Times as ‘Fake News,’ WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 9,
2017, 6:51 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/climate-skeptics-slam-new-yorktimes-as-fake-news/article/2631098.
3. See infra Section II.E.
4. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Except sometimes they don’t. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court,
our most prestigious and important court, sometimes deems
irrelevant facts that reasonable observers may consider important or
even crucial. To be clear, the Justices do not usually opportunistically
embrace “fake” facts like hack politicians or pundits. But the Justices
are sometimes remarkably willing to cast seemingly vital facts aside
when rendering important constitutional decisions. In some
prominent cases, facts don’t matter.
To be sure, the decision about which facts “count” in litigation is
ultimately a legal determination. Courts usually decide the salience
of particular facts, and legal doctrine sheds light on the facts a party
must prove to assert a viable legal claim. What is striking, though, is
the Court’s willingness in constitutional litigation to discard certain
facts without explaining clearly why those facts are legally irrelevant.
Even more striking is the Court’s willingness to do this even when
Congress has relied on these very facts in passing the statute at issue.
The Court’s penchant for avoiding inconvenient facts does not
stop there. The Justices also sometimes take advantage of the muddy
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, treating certain
cases as facial challenges, thus avoiding certain facts that would arise
under an as-applied analysis. In so doing, the Court is able not only
to steer around inconvenient facts but also to issue broad holdings.
The Justices, then, not only decide some cases largely in a factual
vacuum, but do so in the service of aggressive opinions with farreaching consequences.
This Article focuses on three case studies of these interrelated
phenomena. Shelby County v. Holder, 5 Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, 6 and National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius 7 are among the most important
constitutional decisions of the Roberts Court. In each case, five
Justices, citing novel or, at best, deeply contested constitutional
principles, deemed legally irrelevant the very facts that Congress had
thought necessitated the law at issue. In each case, the Justices
offered minimal discussion of the facts it ignored. In each case, they

5.
6.
7.
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offered minimal institutional analysis to support its decision to
ignore the legislature’s findings. In each case, they also treated the
challenge as a broad facial one, though there was good reason to
approach the dispute as a narrower as-applied challenge. Finally, in
each case the Justices, by a 5-4 vote, reined in congressional
authority, indicating that Congress had acted unconstitutionally, at
least in part.
Beneath the Court’s decision to cordon off certain facts as
irrelevant lie deeper intuitions about how the world and
Constitution do (or should) work. These intuitions, contested
among the Justices themselves, are not deeply etched in
constitutional doctrine. Indeed, in Shelby County and NFIB, the
Justices concocted new doctrinal justifications for ruling out certain
facts, and in Citizens United, they overruled important precedent to
do the same. Given the political charge of these cases, it seems
reasonable to ask whether the Court’s repeated disregard for
inconvenient facts might serve an ambitious normative agenda.
This problem is not a new one. As Professor Faigman has
observed, “interpreting the Constitution is a normative enterprise.
Not surprisingly, therefore, in ‘finding’ facts, the Court’s vision often
has been affected by the outcome it sought.” 8 To Professor
Faigman’s observation, we might add that the Court’s preferred
outcome also guides its views of which facts are constitutionally
relevant. 9 And yet, though the determination that certain facts
cannot support federal legislation is plainly a legal one, the Court in
these cases has been strikingly slippery about the legal analysis
guiding the relevance of facts.
Given this doctrinal obfuscation, the Court enjoys great
flexibility to focus on some facts at the exclusion of others. The
Court has been evasive enough about these inquiries that it is
difficult to pin down exactly what moves it is making and whether
those moves carry precedential weight. The common thread is
8. David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 612 (1991).
9. Cf. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 1 (2008) (“The Court’s constitutional pronouncements float above
the empirical mire, neither being informed by contingent realities nor subject to empirical
check by those realities.”).
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that the Court’s treatment of factual questions in constitutional
litigation is often stealthy and conclusory—and still frequently
outcome determinative.
Scholarly attention to the Supreme Court’s use of facts in
constitutional cases is not new. 10 Some great work in recent years has
called attention to a variety of problems involving constitutional
facts, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s fact–finding processes in
constitutional cases; 11 the Court’s reliance on amicus briefs and “inhouse” research to make factual determinations; 12 the deference due
to congressional factual findings; 13 appellate deference to legislative
facts more generally; 14 and the Court’s reliance on “foundational
facts” to drive doctrinal shifts. 15 This scholarship collectively shines
important light on the significance of facts in the Supreme Court’s
constitutional decision-making. 16
This Article seeks to complicate the conclusions from these
important studies by arguing that sometimes facts don’t matter as
much as we like to think. Building on my earlier work on judicial

10. See generally FAIGMAN, supra note 9; Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth:
Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011); Allison Orr Larsen,
Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255 (2012).
11. See, e.g., FAIGMAN, supra note 9; Gorod, supra note 10.
12. See generally Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L.
REV. 1901 (2016) [hereinafter Larsen, Amicus Machine]; Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with
Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757 (2014) [hereinafter Larsen, Amicus Facts]; Larsen, supra
note 10.
13. See generally William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in RightsEnforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (2013); Caitlin E.
Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
1185 (2013); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80
(2001); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2001); John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney,
Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69 (2008); Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as
Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 2027 (2014).
14. See generally Kenji Yoshino, Appellate Deference in the Age of Facts, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 251 (2016).
15. See generally Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 145.
16. A recent news study also identifies numerous factual errors in recent Supreme
Court opinions. See Ryan Gabrielson, It’s a Fact: Supreme Court Errors Aren’t Hard to Find,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/supremecourt-errors-are-not-hard-to-find.
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deference in constitutional cases, 17 this Article explores the Court’s
overlooked propensity to reject the legal relevance of seemingly
central facts. To be sure, it is often important to examine how courts
determine facts, as the scholars in these earlier pieces have very ably
done. But judges, lawyers, and scholars must also recognize that the
content of facts in litigation don’t matter one whit if the court deems
them legally irrelevant.
The Justices, to be sure, likely think that they are doing no more
than exercising their power of judicial review. But when they do so
without any regard for the facts Congress relied on when legislating,
they appear stubbornly determined to consider constitutional
questions in an intellectual vacuum, divorced from the real-world
conditions that prompted congressional action in the first place.
Moreover, the Court’s reliance on new doctrinal developments to
justify its refusal to consider Congress’s facts aggrandizes the
judiciary’s own power. Though the Justices sometimes talk
approvingly of judicial restraint, this doctrinal bait-and-switch
increases their ability to evade Congress’s facts and steer
constitutional law in new directions. As a result, the Court looks less
like an impartial tribunal and more like a political body pretending
that constitutional questions have much easier and clearer answers
than they in fact do. 18
Part I of this Article examines three prominent Roberts Court
constitutional decisions in which the Court rejected the relevance of
facts seemingly justifying the legislation at issue. It further explains
how these judicial moves helped the Court steer its opinion toward
both the outcome it desired and a broad holding facially invalidating
the statutory provisions at issue. Part II offers some explanations for
this phenomenon. These explanations are not justifications, but they
can help us understand the phenomenon from various angles. Part
17. See generally Eric Berger, Gross Error, 91 WASH. L. REV. 929 (2016); Eric Berger,
Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465
(2013) [hereinafter Berger, Deference Determinations]; Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial
Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV.
2029 (2011) [hereinafter Berger, Administrative Law Norms]; Eric Berger, In Search of a
Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision
Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2010).
18. See Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
667 (2015) [hereinafter Berger, Rhetoric].
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III examines the implications of the Court’s aggressive treatment of
legislative facts. The Court’s behavior in these cases poses both
knotty doctrinal questions and broader institutional questions about
the Court’s role in our constitutional system. Finally, Part IV
proposes some modest changes to the Court’s approaches to these
kinds of questions. These proposals would not radically change the
Court’s work, but they would encourage more careful discussion of
facts’ relevance and more even-handed constitutional opinions that
avoid the temptation to brush aside inconvenient evidence.
I. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF FACTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
A. Congressional Facts and Constitutional Decision Making
The Supreme Court in each of the case studies examined here
ignored congressional facts to help it steer the case toward the
outcome the majority favored. 19 These facts fall into the category of
“legislative facts” 20—that is, general facts about the world that
usually “transcend individual disputes and would likely recur in
different cases involving similar subjects.” 21 In each case, Congress,
relying on evidence it had examined, legislated to address what it
believed to be a serious problem requiring a national solution. In
each case, the Court deemed Congress’s facts irrelevant and
concluded that Congress had acted unconstitutionally, at least in
part. Closer consideration of Congress’s facts might not have
required a different outcome but certainly would have complicated
the majority’s opinion.

19. By “congressional facts,” I refer broadly to evidence members of Congress examine
and rely upon when considering a proposed bill. Oftentimes, these facts document the mischief
Congress sought to address in the relevant statute. In some instances, Congress formally
includes these facts as part of a statute. In other instances, Congress relies on reports and other
congressional fact-gathering efforts to educate itself on the realities of the situation. (While
these wrinkles arguably should be legally relevant, the Supreme Court in the cases examined
here brushed aside facts without examining these nuances at all.)
20. By contrast, adjudicative facts deal with the particulars of the case before the court.
See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942).
21. See David L. Faigman, Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases, in HOW LAW KNOWS
156, 162 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007).

532
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1. Shelby County and the social conditions justifying regulation
Shelby County v. Holder considered the constitutionality of
section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), which provided
the “coverage formula” defining which jurisdictions are covered by
section 5 of the Act. 22 Under section 5, covered jurisdictions must
seek preclearance—that is, federal approval—for changes to voting
procedures. 23 Recognizing the longstanding and pernicious history
of voter discrimination in this country, Congress’s purpose behind
section 5 was to suspend “all new voting regulations pending review
by federal authorities to determine whether their use would
perpetuate voting discrimination.” 24
Congress reauthorized the Act several times, but in both 1982
and 2006, its reauthorizations did not alter the coverage formula. 25
Consequently, most jurisdictions covered in 1975 were also covered
in 2013, subject to certain “bail out” provisions. 26 When the U.S.
Attorney General objected to voting changes proposed in the
covered jurisdiction of Shelby County, Alabama, on the grounds that
the proposed changes harmed minority voters, 27 the county sued,
challenging the constitutionality of the coverage formula.
The Supreme Court ruled in Shelby County’s favor, striking
down section 4 in its entirety. 28 Though the constitutionality of
section 5, the preclearance provision, was not at issue in the case, the
Court effectively gutted that section by invalidating the coverage

22. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619–21 (2013).
23. Id. at 2620.
24. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 316 (1966).
25. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973 (2012))); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96
Stat. 131 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2016) (transferred
from 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2012))).
26. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. §
1973(a)); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE
L.J. 174, 211–14 (2007) (discussing the bailout provision).
27. See Joint Appendix at 115a, Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96) (noting that
city had not met “its burden of showing that the submitted changes have neither a
discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect”).
28. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
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formula. Without a coverage formula, no jurisdiction is subject to
section 5’s preclearance requirements.
In striking down section 4, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
opinion emphasized that in reauthorizing the VRA in 2006 without
updating the coverage formula, Congress imposed extreme burdens
on states unjustified by current needs. 29 As the Court put it, “things
have changed dramatically” since 1965. 30 Whereas AfricanAmericans once voted at far lower rates than whites, voter turnout
and registration “approach parity” today. 31 By 2006, “disparities in
voter registration and turnout” no longer existed, 32 and “AfricanAmericans attained political office in record numbers.” 33
Having emphasized that voter discrimination was mostly a thing
of the past, the Court faulted Congress for failing to amend the
scope of the section 4 coverage formula, which was “based on
decades-old data and eradicated practices.” 34 Whereas racial disparity
in voter registration and turnout helped the Court in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach justify the coverage formula and preclearance scheme
in the mid-1960s, 35 such disparity no longer existed. 36 Federal
intrusion into state voting procedures may once have been necessary,
but according to the Court, it was unfair to perpetuate a coverage
formula based on decades-old state practices. 37
The Court’s holding hinged largely on its understanding of the
facts, but it ignored the very facts that had prompted Congress to
reauthorize the VRA in the first place. For example, Congress had
amassed 15,000 pages of findings documenting pervasive and
29. Id. at 2630–31 (asserting that it was irrational for Congress to reauthorize a
coverage formula that was based on forty-year-old data, when current statistics reflect “an
entirely different story”).
30. Id. at 2625.
31. Id.
32. A recent news study questioned Chief Justice Roberts’s data suggesting that blacks’
voter registration rates in 2004 matched or even outstripped whites’ rates. This study
contended that the Chief Justice used numbers that counted Hispanics as white, including
non-citizen Hispanics who could not legally register to vote, thus “inaccurately lowering the
rate for white registration.” See Gabrielson, supra note 16.
33. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628.
34. Id. at 2627.
35. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
36. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627–28 (discussing South Carolina v. Katzenbach).
37. See id. at 2628 (“There is no longer such disparity.”).

534
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troubling ongoing discrimination. 38 This record demonstrated that
voting discrimination was not just a problem of the past. Indeed, the
statute itself included findings detailing evidence of continued
discrimination, such as various election practices used to dilute
minority voting strength. 39
Congress had also relied on numerous pieces of anecdotal
evidence detailing covered jurisdictions’ measures that would either
inhibit racial minorities’ ability to vote or dilute their voting power.40
It also had cited studies indicating that discriminatory purpose
motivated numerous redistricting plans as recently as the 1990s. 41 In
light of these findings, Congress concluded that while
“[d]iscrimination today is more subtle than the visible methods used
in 1965, . . . the effect and results are the same, namely a
diminishing of the minority community’s ability to fully participate
in the electoral process and to elect their preferred candidates.” 42

38. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 note (b)(2) (Supp. III 2016) (Congressional Purpose and
Findings) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)) (“[V]estiges of discrimination in voting
continue to exist as demonstrated by second generation barriers constructed to prevent
minority voters from fully participating in the electoral process.”); Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at
2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2012),
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
39. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 note (b)(4)(a) (Supp. III 2016) (Congressional Purpose
and Findings) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)) (citing as evidence of continued
discrimination “the hundreds of objections interposed, requests for more information
submitted followed by voting changes withdrawn from consideration by jurisdictions covered
by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Section 5 [15 U.S.C. 10304] enforcement actions
undertaken by the Department of Justice in covered jurisdictions since 1982 that prevented
election practices, such as annexation, at-large voting, and the use of multi-member districts,
from being enacted to dilute minority voting strength” (alteration in original)).
40. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 464–65 (D.D.C. 2011) (listing
examples from congressional record), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013).
41. See id. at 465 (noting that Congress had considered several studies).
42. H.R. REP. NO. 109–478, at 6 (2006) (quoted in Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2635
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301 note (b)(5) (Supp. III 2016)
(Congressional Purpose and Findings) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)) (“The
evidence clearly shows the continued need for Federal oversight in jurisdictions covered by the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 since 1982, as demonstrated in the counties certified by the
Attorney General for Federal examiner and observer coverage and the tens of thousands of
Federal observers that have been dispatched to observe elections in covered jurisdictions.”).
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Interestingly, the majority did not dispute the veracity of
Congress’s findings. 43 Rather, the Court disparaged those facts’
relevance and signaled that Congress should have focused on
different facts. 44 “Regardless of how [we] look at the record,”
it explained, “no one can fairly say that it shows anything
approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’
discrimination . . . in 1965.” 45 Continued voter discrimination, then,
was irrelevant in the Court’s eyes, because it paled in comparison to
discrimination of years past. The Court, however, never explained
why continuing discrimination is legally irrelevant just because it is
less severe than past discrimination. 46
The majority also did not grapple carefully with Congress’s
findings that the preclearance provision continued to play an
important role in reducing voter discrimination. 47 To its credit, the
Court did concede that the VRA deserved substantial credit for the
decrease in voting discrimination. 48 But in so doing, the Court did
not explain why preclearance did not remain a vital tool to combat
voter discrimination, especially given evidence indicating that the
preclearance provision continued to do real work blocking voter
discrimination. For example, the House report, drawing on
voluminous evidence, had found that “between 1982 and 2006,
DOJ objections blocked over 700 voting changes based on a

43. But see Ross, supra note 13, at 2062–63 (arguing that the majority in Shelby County
distrusted Congress’s facts).
44. See id. at 2061 (“[T]he majority selectively emphasized certain record evidence,
second-guessed other evidence, and simply ignored other evidence.”).
45. Id. at 2062 (quoting Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629).
46. See Ross, supra note 13, at 2062 (“The conservative Justices essentially disposed of
the remainder of the 15,000 page congressional record supporting the Act in one sentence.”).
47. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 note (b)(1) (Supp. III 2016) (Congressional Purpose and
Findings) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)) (“Significant progress has been made in
eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority voters, including increased
numbers of registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and minority representation in
Congress, State legislatures, and local elected offices. This progress is the direct result of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 [this chapter and chapters 105 and 107 of this title].” (alteration
in original)).
48. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (“There is no doubt that these improvements are
in large part because of the Voting Rights Act. The Act has proved immensely successful at
redressing racial discrimination and integrating the voting process.”).
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determination that the changes were discriminatory.” 49 The obvious
implication was that without preclearance, voter discrimination in
this country would have been substantially worse than it is. The
Court, however, brushed aside these facts, arguing simply that
Congress’s record “played no role in shaping the statutory formula”
at issue. 50
The Court, to be sure, was correct that the coverage formula had
been designed decades earlier. The majority, however, did not
explain why it should not consider evidence before Congress that
updating the coverage formula would have been ill advised. 51 Nor
did the majority grapple with congressional experts who explained
that tinkering with the coverage formula might have turned the
statute “into a farce.” 52 Based on the evidence before it, Congress
concluded that voter discrimination was still a problem serious
enough to merit preclearance and that, given the practical problems
inherent in updating, the best option was to preserve the old
coverage formula. 53 The Court did not engage with any of
these facts.

49. See id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 21
(2006)). Statistics about DOJ objections can hardly be blamed on an overzealous, liberal
Department of Justice, given that Republicans controlled the White House for sixteen of the
twenty-four years in question. See also Voting Determination Letters for Alabama, THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/votingdetermination-letters-alabama (listing DOJ objections to Alabama voting practices by year).
50. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629.
51. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting The
Continuing Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 99 (2006) (explaining that updating the formula on the basis of turnout and
registration data from 2000 and 2004 would have ignored the “long, open, and notorious
history of disenfranchising minority citizens”)), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d,
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
52. 152 CONG. REC. H5181 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (criticizing proposal in House to change the coverage formula); see also Shelby
Cty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 438 (citing voting rights scholars).
53. See Shelby Cty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (“Congress in 2006 found that voting
discrimination by covered jurisdictions had continued into the 21st century, and that the
protections of Section 5 were still needed to safeguard racial and language minority voters.”).
To be sure, an updated coverage formula was probably theoretically preferable, see id. at 438
(noting that many voting rights scholars before Congress in theory preferred an “updated
trigger”), but most scholars also told Congress that they were “skeptical” about plans to
update the coverage formula, see id.

537

1.BERGER.FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/10/2018 2:20 PM

2017

The Court presumably ignored these congressional facts because
it believed that preclearance imposed unfair burdens on covered
jurisdictions whose behavior had improved in recent decades. 54 But
given the Court’s concern for the burdens the VRA imposed on
covered jurisdictions, the Court should have also more carefully
explained why the statute’s “bail out” provision was inadequate.
That provision permits covered jurisdictions to relieve themselves of
preclearance burdens by demonstrating their improved practices. 55
Almost 200 jurisdictions have bailed out of the preclearance
requirement successfully since the provision took effect in 1984. 56
Though the Court made passing reference to these provisions, it
failed to confront the argument that the VRA, far from being static,
is “capable of adjusting to changing conditions.” 57 The Court’s blind
eye to congressional facts and its sympathy to the burdens the statute
imposed on benevolent state governments, then, is especially strange
given that the statute provided a mechanism for those very states to
exempt themselves.
The Court’s decision to brush aside Congress’s findings is even
stranger in light of the fact that section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment entrusts Congress with broad power to protect against
race-based voter discrimination. 58 The Court’s treatment of
Congress’s facts amounted to a legal determination that those facts
were constitutionally irrelevant, but the Court did not explain why
that must be so. If anything, one would think that section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment should require the opposite presumption that

54. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619 (“[T]he Act imposes current burdens and must
be justified by current needs.” (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557
U.S. 193, 203 (2009))).
55. See 52 U.S.C. § 10303 (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(a) (2012)).
56. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. See Jeremy Amar-Dolan, The Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment
Standard of Review, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1477, 1500 (2014) (arguing that because the
Fifteenth Amendment’s subject matter is narrower, Congress’s power to enforce it is not at risk
of becoming a plenary power, and therefore courts should give Congress more deference when
it legislates under that provision); Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights
Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 381−86 (2014) (arguing that in light of section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, federal preclearance for voting changes is a modest measure Congress
may take to protect against voter discrimination).
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Congress has broad leeway to tackle race-based voter discrimination
and that its factual findings therefore deserve deference. 59 The
Court, however, refused to grapple with these complications,
preferring instead to brush aside inconvenient evidence. 60
2. Citizens United and the political conditions justifying regulation
Citizens United v. FEC 61 provides another example of the Court’s
refusal to engage with congressional facts. The Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) contained several amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). Most relevant
here, it prohibited corporations and unions from using their general
treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is
an “electioneering communication” or that expressly advocates for
the election or defeat of a candidate. 62
Citizens United, a non-profit corporation, released Hillary: The
Movie, a documentary attacking Hillary Clinton, who was then
running for president. Recognizing that it might run afoul of BCRA
if it ran the movie in the days leading up to the primary election,
Citizens United sought to enjoin the Federal Election Commission
(FEC) from enforcing these provisions on the grounds that BCRA
violated the First Amendment. 63 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed
with the plaintiff, holding that restrictions on independent
expenditures by corporations’ general treasuries for election-related
speech violated the First Amendment. 64
As in Shelby County, the Court deemed irrelevant facts that had
motivated the law in the first place. Before passing BCRA, Congress
had carefully studied the role of money in elections. Specifically, in
the wake of the 1996 election, the Senate Committee on
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; Michael W. McConnell,
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153,
182 (1997) (noting that the Reconstruction Amendments left the remedy to Congress).
60. Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46−47, Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 1296); Ross, supra note 13, at 2061 (arguing that the majority’s approach to Congress’s findings
“appears to have been driven by a presumption about political process malfunction”).
61. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
62. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 2 U.S.C. §
441b (2012)).
63. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320–22.
64. The Court upheld BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements. See id. at 372.
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Governmental Affairs commenced an extensive investigation into
campaign practices during that election. The Committee in 1998
ultimately issued a six-volume report presenting its findings. 65
The report concluded that the nation’s election system was “in
crisis, with the worst problems stemming not from activities that are
illegal under current law, but from those that are legal.” 66 In
particular, the report blamed the “soft money loophole” for causing
“a meltdown of a campaign finance system.” 67 The report concluded
that in 1996 “both parties [had] promised and provided [large
donors with] special access to [important] candidates and
[g]overnment officials in exchange for large soft-money
contributions.” 68 Congress paid close attention to the report’s
conclusions and ended up enacting many of the Committee’s
proposed reforms when it passed BCRA in 2002. 69
Though McConnell v. FEC had upheld BCRA’s limitations on
electioneering communications, 70 Citizens United reversed course.71
Of particular relevance here, Citizens United gave virtually no weight
to Congress’s findings documenting the pernicious role of money in
our elections. 72 The majority pointedly rejected the argument that
Congress has a “compelling constitutional basis” to guard against
corruption and the appearance of corruption in local and national
elections. 73 Instead, the Court summarily concluded “that
independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do
not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 74
In so concluding, the Court entirely ignored the Senate
Committee report’s findings to the contrary. 75 The report, indeed,

65. See S. REP. NO. 105-167, vol. 1, at 7−9 (1998).
66. S. REP. NO. 105-167, vol. 4, at 4610.
67. See id. at 4611; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 129 (2003) (summarizing
Senate Committee report).
68. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 130 (summarizing Senate Committee report).
69. See id. at 132.
70. Id.
71. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 357 (majority opinion).
75. Citizen United’s refusal to consider the report’s findings contrasted sharply with
McConnell, which had not only discussed the report in some detail but noted that Congress

540

1.BERGER.FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

525

1/10/2018 2:20 PM

When Facts Don’t Matter

had asserted that “large concentrations of wealth . . . hav[e] the
potential to corrupt the federal election process.” 76 For example, the
report documented numerous allegations of government officials
taking action during an election cycle “to obtain or reward a
campaign contribution.” 77 Many such actions did not violate the law
prior to BCRA but nonetheless, as the report emphasized, “create an
appearance of favoritism or impropriety.” 78 The report went so
far as to note that most experts it heard from agreed that
this culture of buying political access amounted to a “crisis in
American democracy.” 79
The report did not reflect the thoughts merely of some fringe
senators. To the contrary, these conclusions reflected the views of
both the Senate majority and minority. 80 Additionally, important
scholarship and the district court’s findings in McConnell v. FEC
both reinforced the report’s basic conclusions. 81

had enacted many of the report’s proposed reforms in BCRA to address the concerns raised by
the report’s findings. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129−32.
76. S. REP. NO. 105-167, vol. 5, at 7516 (1998).
77. Id. at 7541.
78. Id. at 7542.
79. Id. at 7516 (quoting former Vice President Walter Mondale and noting that most
of the expert witnesses from whom the Committee heard agreed with this sentiment).
80. The majority report had focused on Democratic Party fundraising, while the
minority report had focused on Republican Party fundraising. See generally S. REP. NO. 105167; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 130.
81. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555–60, 622–25 (D.D.C.)
(finding that corporations and labor unions routinely notify members of Congress about their
electioneering communications relevant to those members’ elections with the not-so-subtle
objective of currying favor), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in
part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST
94–95 (2011); Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court 2011 Term – Foreword: Democracy and
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012) (“[I]t is just as possible to defend campaign finance
regulation as an effort to clear the channels of political change by reducing the influence of
wealth on electoral outcomes.”); Jennifer Mueller, The Unwilling Donor, 90 WASH. L. REV.
1783, 1789 (2015); Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1105−06 (2002) (noting that
“corporations might be particularly pernicious rent seekers,” and that therefore discrimination
against corporate political speech might be “an appropriate response to the competitive
advantages provided by the corporate form in the market for legislation”); Thomas Stratmann,
What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 S.
ECON. J. 606, 615 (1991) (concluding that sugar industry interest groups successfully used
political contributions to purchase legislative subsidies).
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Though Congress had compiled this “virtual mountain of
research on the corruption that previous legislation had failed to
avert,” 82 the Court dismissed those findings as irrelevant. The Court
emphasized that preventing quid pro quo corruption—that is,
political favors in direct exchange for monetary contributions—was
the only permissible governmental interest justifying the kinds of
regulations at issue. 83 Because the Court limited the doctrinal inquiry
to this narrow definition of corruption, the Court could ignore
Congress’s findings. 84 As the Court explained, there were no “direct
examples of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures.”85
“Ingratiation and access,” the Court asserted, “are not
corruption.” 86 This narrow definition of “corruption” allowed the
Justices to turn a blind eye to the very facts that Congress thought
merited legislation. 87
To its credit, the Court at least acknowledged this doctrinal
move, tracing it back to the seminal campaign finance decision,
Buckley v. Valeo. 88 Buckley, however, was hardly the Court’s only
word on the matter. 89 Furthermore, merely citing Buckley as the
source of the unique concern for quid pro quo corruption does not
adequately justify the Court’s refusal to consider factual evidence of
corruption (understood more broadly) that Congress thought
justified the statute.

82. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 359 (majority opinion) (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important
governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest
was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450
(2014) (“Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—’quid pro quo’ corruption.”).
84. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. See id. at 360 (majority opinion) (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 360).
86. Id.
87. See Zephyr Teachout, Facts in Exile: Corruption and Abstraction in Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 295, 298 (2011) (explaining that
Justice Kennedy seemed to believe that facts did not aid the analysis in Citizens United).
88. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345 (“The Buckley Court explained that the
potential for quid pro quo corruption distinguished direct contributions to candidates from
independent expenditures.”).
89. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Phrased differently, the majority’s approach enabled it to duck
the strict scrutiny analysis that examines not only the burden on free
speech but also the mischief Congress sought to address. How could
the Court know whether the government has a compelling interest
in stemming corruption (broadly defined) and the appearance of
corruption without considering Congress’s evidence that corruption
exists and causes serious harm to our political system? And how
could the Court know that BCRA’s efforts to limit such corruption
were not narrowly tailored enough without examining the statute
against the problem Congress sought to remedy? The Court’s
narrow definition of “corruption” may have seemed like a clever
rhetorical move that determined the outcome of the case. However,
on closer analysis, this argument merely sidestepped the relevant
First Amendment inquiry.
The Court’s ungenerous attitude toward congressional findings
is especially noteworthy, because BCRA permitted corporations to
engage in election-related speech through Political Action
Committees (PACs). 90 Congress, in other words, left open PACs as
an avenue for corporations to engage in the same speech that BCRA
regulated. 91 The Court quickly dismissed the PACs as “burdensome
alternatives,” 92 but it is far from clear why this should be so. As
Professor Briffault explains, the various rules regulating PACs, such
as record-keeping requirements, “appear to be pretty basic
requirements essential to any campaign finance regime for assuring
the regularity, responsibility, and transparency of campaign finance
participants.” 93 Moreover, the Court pointed to no facts to support
its conclusion that the PAC requirement was too burdensome. 94
90. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2)(C) (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(2)(C) (2012)).
91. Cf. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003) (“The PAC option allows
corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political
influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it
lets the Government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure . . .
without jeopardizing the associational rights of advocacy organizations’ members . . . .”).
92. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337−38.
93. Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance
After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 666 (2011).
94. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 416 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority found the PAC option too burdensome without reference to the record but simply by
resorting to its “own unsupported factfinding”).

543

1.BERGER.FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/10/2018 2:20 PM

2017

To be fair, the majority had significant constitutional arguments
in its favor. The law did “muffle” some political speech, 95 which
enjoys special status under the First Amendment. 96 The Court also
made the legitimate point that the government’s interest in
campaign finance regulations is undermined, at least in part, by the
frequency with which many political contributors circumvent such
regulations. 97 Moreover, strict scrutiny usually protects the right
holder, so the Court may well have struck down the law even had it
examined the facts.
That all said, the Court did not actually apply the strict scrutiny
test to the facts upon which Congress relied so much as announce
that the government had failed it. The Court therefore never
explained why, given Congress’s findings, the challenged policy was
not narrowly enough tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest, especially given that the law still permitted corporations to
engage in election-related speech through PACs. 98 The Court, in
short, gave scant hearing to the argument that campaign finance
regulation is necessary to protect against wealthy individuals and
corporations controlling the outcome of elections and thereby
skewing policy to suit their interests. 99
3. NFIB and the object of congressional regulation
A majority of Justices also deemed important facts legally
irrelevant in their Commerce Clause analysis in NFIB v. Sebelius. 100
That portion of the case involved a constitutional challenge to the
individual mandate of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA). The ACA aimed to increase the number of
Americans with health insurance and to decrease the cost of health
95. See id. at 336−41, 354 (majority opinion).
96. See id. at 336−41.
97. See id. at 364 (“Political speech is so ingrained in our culture that speakers find
ways to circumvent campaign finance laws.”).
98. See id. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The real issue in this case concerns how,
not if, the appellant may finance its electioneering.”); Alexander Tsesis, Multifactoral Free
Speech, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1017, 1042−49 (2016) (arguing that the Court gave inadequate
scrutiny to whether corporate contributions from general treasury funds harm eligible voters’
abilities to influence the political process).
99. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 30.
100. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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care. 101 To that end, the individual mandate requires most Americans
to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance coverage. 102 The
challengers asserted, inter alia, that the mandate exceeded
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
Chief Justice Roberts and, in a separate joint dissent, Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito all agreed that the Commerce
Clause did not authorize the mandate. 103 Though the Court
ultimately did uphold the constitutionality of the mandate because
the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan agreed that it was constitutional under Congress’s taxing
power, the Justices nevertheless addressed the Commerce Clause
issue at some length.
The Chief Justice, for his part, concluded that the mandate does
not “regulate” commerce but instead compels unwilling individuals
to become active in commerce by buying health insurance.104
“Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate
individuals precisely because they are doing nothing,” the Chief
Justice concluded, “would open a new and potentially vast domain
to congressional authority.” 105 Congress, on this account, was
regulating inactivity by requiring people to enter a market for health
insurance they otherwise would avoid. 106
The joint dissent saw the facts similarly. It contended that
uninsured young persons “are quite simply not participants in [the
health care] market, and cannot be made so (and thereby subjected
to regulation) by the simple device of defining participants to include
all those who will, later in their lifetime, probably purchase the
goods or services covered by the mandated insurance.” 107

101. See id. at 2580.
102. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
103. The joint dissent disagreed with the Chief Justice’s opinion insofar as he upheld the
individual mandate under Congress’s taxing power. However, like the Chief Justice, the joint
dissent thought the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s commerce power. Because the
two opinions’ analyses of the commerce issue were similar, this Part will discuss them together.
Similarly, this Article will sometimes refer to these five Justices’ views of the Commerce Clause
issue as the view of the majority (because on this issue, they were).
104. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 2648 (joint dissent).
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The Chief Justice and joint dissent’s characterization of the
mandate as unwelcome governmental regulation of the inactive
turned in part on a conception of time that differed from Congress’s.
Congress viewed the problem over a period of months or even
years. 108 A person who is healthy today may become gravely ill or
injured tomorrow. The young and vigorous will eventually become
old and infirm. 109 Almost everybody will eventually need health care,
and some people will unexpectedly require it in the next year. For
those reasons, in Congress’s eyes, an individual’s decision not to buy
health insurance today should constitute action. 110 As Dean Minow
puts it, that decision “becomes a predicate for financial disaster when
medical bills arrive,” as they almost inevitably will. 111
By contrast, the Chief Justice and the joint dissent saw the same
decision through a much narrower temporal frame. Individuals who
don’t want health insurance should be viewed only as of the present
moment. 112 So understood, they cannot be deemed active in the
health care market (or anything else). These people are “doing
nothing” right now, 113 and it doesn’t matter that some inevitably will
go to the doctor tomorrow.
Given their characterizations, the Chief Justice and joint
dissenters could conclude that the individual mandate compels
unwilling participation in a market. 114 This conclusion was crucial.
Indeed, the key doctrinal innovation––that Congress cannot use its
Commerce Clause authority to regulate inactivity––hinged on the
assertion that the individual mandate forced people into a market
they otherwise would have avoided.

108. See Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence: “Reasonable Interpretation” and the
Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 126–27 (2012).
109. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
110. See Minow, supra note 108, at 126–27.
111. See id. at 127.
112. See id.
113. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586–87 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
114. See id. The Chief Justice acknowledged that economists might see no distinction
between activity and inactivity, but he evaded this difficulty by concluding that “the distinction
between doing something and doing nothing would not have been lost” on the Constitution’s
framers. Id. at 2589.

546

1.BERGER.FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

525

1/10/2018 2:20 PM

When Facts Don’t Matter

This doctrinal innovation may have been rhetorically clever, but
it deliberately turned a blind eye to Congress’s findings. More
specifically, both the Chief Justice and the joint dissent ignored
evidence demonstrating that many uninsured people are doing
something. Specifically, many people are consuming health care
without paying for it, thereby passing their costs on to
other Americans. 115
Congress, in fact, included in the statute itself findings
supporting this very proposition. 116 For example, Congress found
that “[t]he cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured
was $43,000,000,000 in 2008” and substantially affected interstate
commerce. 117 It further found that “[t]he economy loses up to
$207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer health and shorter
lifespan of the uninsured.” 118 Congress concluded that the mandate,
in conjunction with the Act’s other provisions, would significantly
reduce this economic cost by reducing the number of uninsured
persons. 119 Admittedly, Congress did little of this research itself,
looking instead to policy briefings and academic studies.120
Nevertheless, Congress relied on the evidence it studied to deem
health care reform an urgent legislative priority with broad
ramifications for the national economy. 121
In addition to this compiled evidence, Congress highlighted the
reason why the decision not to purchase health insurance should not
be characterized as “inactivity.” In the provision articulating the
connection between the national economy and interstate commerce,
Congress explained:
The requirement regulates activity that is commercial and
economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(A) (2012).
116. See generally id. § 18091(1)–(2)(J).
117. Id. § 18091(2)(F); see also id. § 18091(1); Jack Hadley et al., Covering the
Uninsured in 2008: Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, Aug. 25, 2008, at 402 (estimating that, in 2008, uninsured people would receive
$54.3 billion of uncompensated care).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E).
119. Id. § 18091(2)(F).
120. See Daniel A. Crane, Enacted Legislative Findings and the Deference Problem, 102
GEO. L.J. 637, 652–75 (2014).
121. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 18091.
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and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is
purchased. In the absence of the requirement, some individuals
would make an economic and financial decision to forego health
insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure, which increases
financial risks to households and medical providers. 122

Congress, in other words, found that the great number of
uninsured individuals burdens the nation’s health care system by
consuming health care without paying for it. 123 Because almost
everybody enters this market during their lives and because many
people enter it unwillingly or unexpectedly every year, 124 Congress
was simply trying to ensure that people would pay, through
insurance, for the services they inevitably consume. Quite simply,
many uninsured persons get sick, go to the emergency room, can’t
pay their bills, and thus raise the cost of health care for everyone
else. 125 Consequently, “the decision to forego insurance is hardly . . .
equivalent to ‘doing nothing,’” but is rather, as Justice Ginsburg put
it, “an economic decision Congress has the authority to address
under the Commerce Clause.” 126
As in Shelby County and Citizens United, the majority of Justices
cast aside these findings as legally irrelevant. However, whereas in
those cases the Court indicated that Congress had focused on the
wrong kinds of facts, the NFIB majority signaled that Congress had
mischaracterized the phenomenon. In the majority’s eyes, an

122. Id. § 18091(2)(A).
123. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
124. See id. at 2610 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR U.S. ADULTS: NATIONAL HEALTH
INTERVIEW SURVEY 2009, ser. 10, no. 249, tbl. 37, at 124 (Dec. 2010)).
125. See 155 CONG. REC. H12,853 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. JacksonLee); Arthur Nussbaum, Can Congress Make You Buy Health Insurance? The Affordable Care
Act, National Health Care Reform, and the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 50
DUQ. L. REV. 411, 452–53 (2012) (arguing everyone participates in the health care market
because the uninsured are really just self-insured); Robert F. Rich et al., The Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010: Implementation Challenges in the Context of Federalism, 16 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 77, 96–97 (2013) (discussing whether the individual mandate
regulates the “insurance” market or the “health care” market).
126. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2617 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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individual’s decision to self-insure was inactivity and therefore
beyond the scope of commerce.
Accordingly, Congress’s factual findings about the economic
consequences of free riders in the health care market were legally
irrelevant. 127 As in Shelby County and Citizens United, the Chief
Justice mostly did not dispute Congress’s facts as an empirical
matter. He did, however, contend that Congress was relying on mere
prophesy when it determined that some uninsured people will
consume health care without paying for it. 128 This argument,
however, ignored Congress’s evidence that many uninsured people
do go to the hospital each year and fail to pay their bills. 129 The Chief
Justice and joint dissenters, in other words, crafted an analysis that
treated hard data as hypothetical.
The Chief Justice and joint dissent’s approach to Congress’s facts
in NFIB is even stranger, because it is at odds with other cases
emphasizing the respect owed to legislative choices. Most relevant
here, in King v. Burwell, a statutory interpretation case about the
ACA, the Court declared that “[a] fair reading of legislation
demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan.” 130 In stark
contrast to NFIB’s Commerce Clause discussion, the Court engaged
seriously with the ACA’s policy objectives to “minimize . . . adverse
selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include
healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.” 131
King, thus, admonished that courts should “respect the role of the
127. See Crane, supra note 120, at 652–75.
128. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The proposition that
Congress may dictate the conduct of an individual today because of prophesied future activity
finds no support in our precedent.”).
129. The analysis of the Commerce Clause issue was not the only important portion of
the opinion in which the Justices disagreed about facts. For example, in the sections of the
opinions addressing the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion under the Spending
Clause, the Justices disagreed about whether that expansion resulted in two separate Medicaid
programs or one. Compare id. at 2605–06 (“The Medicaid expansion . . . accomplishes a shift
in kind, not merely degree.”), with id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Medicaid, as amended by the ACA . . . is a
single program with a constant aim.”). See also Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9–29 (2013) (discussing whether the Medicaid expansion was an
incremental change or a shift in kind).
130. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
131. Id. at 2493 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I)).
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Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done.” 132 Neither
King nor the constitutional cases examined here explain why the
Court should afford respect to legislative goals and findings in some
contexts but not others involving the same statute. 133
Five Justices’ approach to facts in their Commerce Clause
discussions may seem inconsequential dicta, given that the Court
decided to uphold the mandate anyway under Congress’s taxing
power. Nevertheless, the fact that five Justices took the trouble to
write or join extensive discussions rejecting Congress’s view of what
it was regulating speaks to the Court’s disregard for congressional
facts. If anything, the Chief Justice’s willingness to cast aside
congressional findings here is especially striking because the
discussion was entirely unnecessary. 134
B. Facts and Facial Challenges
In addition to ignoring Congress’s facts, the Justices in these
cases also treated each challenge as a facial one. This move enabled
the majorities to avoid other inconvenient facts. It also helped them
write broad opinions that invalidated the relevant provisions in all
their applications rather than simply as applied to the plaintiffs in
those cases. 135
The decision to treat a case as a facial or as-applied challenge may
seem unrelated to its treatment of congressional findings. However,
upon closer examination, both determinations allow the Justices to
push aside facts they prefer to avoid. We do not typically think of the
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges as being a
determination about facts, but whether a challenge is framed as facial

132. Id. at 2496.
133. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 94
(2012) (arguing that the Chief Justice’s approach to the Commerce Clause in NFIB “reads a
statute to create constitutional problems”).
134. The joint dissenters shared this view, but their discussion of this issue was necessary,
because they would have invalidated the individual mandate and therefore needed to explain
why Congress lacked the power to pass the mandate under the Taxing, Commerce, and
Necessary and Proper Clauses.
135. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF.
L. REV. 915, 917 (2011) (noting the Justices’ “assumption that facial challenges are and ought
to be rare”).
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or as-applied has potentially important consequences for the universe
of relevant facts.
Though the Court’s approach to the distinction between facial
and as-applied challenges is inconsistent, 136 as-applied challenges
often implicate narrower, adjudicative facts involving the particular
party to the litigation. 137 By contrast, a facial challenge tends to
involve broader, legislative facts about the statute writ large. After all,
the facial challenge calls into question the validity of the statute in all
its applications. To be sure, the universe of relevant facts does not
define the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, and
the characterization offered here does not always hold. However,
given that the Justices sometimes take advantage of the inchoate
lines between the two to pursue substantive goals, 138 it is important
to recognize that the choice between facial and as-applied challenges
can shape the facts at issue.
1. Shelby County
The Court treated the lawsuit in Shelby County as a facial
challenge. 139 This move limited the universe of facts the Court
considered. It also greatly expanded the reach of its decision.
Shelby County brought the case as a facial challenge, seeking to
invalidate the coverage formula in its entirety, as opposed to
challenging only its applicability to the county itself.140
Notwithstanding this plaintiff ’s initial framing, the Court’s stated

136. See, e.g., Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules
Versus Invalidating Statutes in Toto, 98 VA. L. REV. 301, 307–18 (2012).
137. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 662 (3d ed. 1988) (“Challenges to the validity of a statute as applied to
specific facts . . . turn necessarily on a determination of what the adjudicative facts were.”).
However, it is important to note that the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is
muddy and shifting. As Professor Metzger points out, this formulation was absent from later
editions of Hart and Wechsler’s Federal Courts casebook. See Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Facial
Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 882 (2005).
138. See Metzger, supra note 137, at 880.
139. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding that the coverage
formula “can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance”); see also
id. at 2644–48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s decision to treat the case as a
facial challenge).
140. See id. at 2621–22 (majority opinion).
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preference is to treat cases as as-applied challenges. 141 Indeed, the
Supreme Court generally, and the Roberts Court in particular, has
repeatedly resisted facial challenges on the theory that litigants can
instead bring narrower as-applied attacks (on remand, if need be). 142
Had the Court treated the case as an as-applied challenge, it
would have asked whether preclearance was an appropriate remedy
for voter discrimination in Shelby County itself or perhaps in the
State of Alabama. If the Court needed more information to make
this determination, it could have remanded the case for jurisdictionspecific factual findings. Instead, by permitting the case to proceed as
a facial attack, the Court was able to brush aside evidence that voter
discrimination persisted in Shelby County. 143
Because it treated the case as a facial challenge, the Court
reviewed the propriety of preclearance for all jurisdictions subject to
it rather than focusing on the record of voter discrimination of the
jurisdiction at issue in this case. In so doing, the Court made it easier
to find a constitutional violation. By pointing to broad national
trends indicating changed times and reduced discrimination, the
Justices were able to sidestep evidence that Shelby County’s and
Alabama’s records of voter discrimination were damning enough to
merit preclearance. 144
The Court’s opinion certainly would have been harder to write
had it looked more closely at the state’s and county’s histories. More

141. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court,
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 773 (2009) (“One recurring theme of the Roberts Court’s
jurisprudence to date is its resistance to facial constitutional challenges and preference for asapplied litigation.”).
142. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450
(2008) (“Facial challenges are disfavored.”); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987) (“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid.”); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20–21 (1960); Yazoo & Miss.
Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219–20 (1912); Fallon, supra note 135, at
917; Metzger, supra note 141, at 773.
143. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (contending that the dissent’s argument that the
Court should consider Shelby County’s actual record of voting discrimination “is like saying
that a driver pulled over pursuant to a policy of stopping all redheads cannot complain about
that policy, if it turns out his license has expired”).
144. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 441–43 (D.D.C. 2011) (detailing
history of voter discrimination in Shelby County), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d,
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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specifically, the Court’s decision to treat the case as a facial challenge
allowed it to ignore important trial court findings about the record
of voter discrimination in the jurisdictions at issue. As the district
court explained, in the decades since the initial passage of the
VRA, Alabama had a substantial history of creating at-large
electoral districts designed to keep its black citizens “politically
downtrodden.” 145 Between 1982 and 2005, Alabama had the
second-highest rate of successful voter discrimination suits under
section 2 of the VRA. 146 In the 1980s, Shelby County itself had been
a party to litigation challenging these practices and had entered into
a consent decree agreeing to change its at-large system to a singlemember district with one majority-black district. 147 As recently as
2008, the U.S. Attorney General objected to a redistricting plan that
would have eliminated the sole majority-black district in a city within
Shelby County. 148
Had the Court considered only this narrower history of voter
discrimination in the jurisdiction at issue, it would have been
substantially harder to conclude that preclearance was unfairly
burdening Shelby County itself. As Justice Ginsburg summarized in
dissent, “Alabama’s sorry history of § 2 violations alone provides
sufficient justification for Congress’ determination in 2006 that the
State should remain subject to § 5’s preclearance requirement.” 149 In
fact, Shelby County itself did not challenge the specific application of
preclearance to any of its proposed voting changes. 150 But by viewing
the case through a broad nationwide lens, the Court was able to
highlight that “things have changed,” 151 without having to confront
evidence that things may not have changed enough in the very
county that initiated the litigation.

145. See id. at 442 (citing Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1357 (M.D.
Ala. 1986)).
146. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Mississippi had the
highest rate. See id.
147. See Shelby Cty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 442–43.
148. See id.
149. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
150. See Shelby Cty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
151. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (majority opinion).
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The Court’s treatment also tremendously extended the reach of
its decision. Because the Court vindicated Shelby County’s facial
challenge, its ruling invalidated the coverage formula in its entirety,
not just as applied to the plaintiff. As a result, the Court effectively
removed preclearance as a tool for combatting voter discrimination
nationwide. The Court did so despite the VRA’s “exceptionally
broad severability provision,” 152 indicating that “[i]f any provision of
[this Act] or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is
held invalid, the remainder of [the Act] and the application of the
provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.” 153 The Court’s
aggressive rejection of the entire preclearance scheme, then, ignored
both Congress’s facts and legal instructions.
2. Citizens United
Shelby County’s breadth is notable, but it is not anomalous. In
Citizens United, the Court also declared the statute in question
facially unconstitutional. 154 Indeed, the Court’s move in Citizens
United was even more aggressive, converting an as-applied challenge
into a facial one. 155 As in Shelby County, the decision to treat the case
as a facial challenge helped the Court simultaneously evade
important facts and extend the reach of the decision.
The plaintiffs in Citizens United brought an as-applied challenge,
contending, inter alia, that section 441b of BCRA was
unconstitutional as applied to Hillary: The Movie. 156 Nevertheless,
the Court treated the challenge as a facial one. 157 As Justice Stevens
pointed out, had the plaintiff itself brought a facial challenge, “the
parties could have developed, through the normal process of
litigation, a record about the actual effects of § 203, its actual

152. Id. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
153. 52 U.S.C. § 10313 (Supp. III 2016) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. §
1973p (2012)).
154. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321, 330 (2010) (justifying decision to
treat case as a facial challenge).
155. See id. at 398–99 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. See id. at 321 (majority opinion).
157. See id. at 330 (“[I]t is necessary to consider . . . the facial validity of §441b’s
expenditure ban.”).
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burdens and its actual benefits, on all manner of corporations and
unions.” 158 Citizens United, however, had abandoned its facial
challenge in the district court, 159 so there was no such record. As we
have already seen, the Court ignored the facts that prompted
legislative action. By recharacterizing the as-applied challenge as a
facial one, it similarly avoided considering facts about the effects of
the law.
Also like Shelby County, the decision in Citizens United to treat
the challenge as a facial one made it easier to strike down the statute.
Had the Court actually grappled with facts about the role of money
in politics, it might have been harder to conclude that the statute
was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental
interest. By invalidating the statute on its face without the benefit of
a district court record, the Court could emphasize the statute’s
imposition on free speech without engaging with the harms the
statute sought to remedy.
Of course, it is possible that a fully developed district court
record would have supported the majority’s holding. 160 Perhaps, for
example, the trial court could have found that money finds its way
into politics anyway, 161 so that section 441b was not effective enough
to justify its intrusion on free speech. However, by ruling without
the benefit of any record, the Court was able to reach its desired
result without having to grapple with facts about the law’s effects.
Finally, and again like Shelby County, the Court’s facial
invalidation of section 441b increased the significance of its decision.
Quite simply, the ruling invalidated the statutory provision in all its

158. Id. at 399 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. See Motion for Summary Judgment by Citizens United, Citizens United v. FEC,
530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 52); Stipulation Regarding Count 5 of the
Amended Complaint by Citizens United, Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp.2d 274
(D.D.C. 2008) (No. 53); Order Dismissing Count 5 of the Amended Complaint, Citizens
United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp.2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 54); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
396–97 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that Citizens United
“expressly abandoned its facial challenge”).
160. But see McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).
161. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (“[P]olitical money, like water, has to go
somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air.”).
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applications, rather than just as applied to one plaintiff. A narrower,
as-applied holding could have permitted the plaintiff to show
Hillary: The Movie in the days leading up to an election but would
have reserved for future cases the constitutionality of section 441b
applied to other entities in other contexts. 162 The Court, instead,
struck down the provision in all its applications, thus issuing a
decision with a tremendous reach.
3. NFIB
Though NFIB did not use the language of facial and as-applied
challenges, it too can be thought of in those terms. The Chief
Justice’s and joint dissent’s approaches essentially converted an asapplied challenge (brought by uninsured non-free riders 163) to a facial
challenge (seeking to invalidate the individual mandate as applied to
all individuals, including free riders who consume health care
without paying for it). As in Shelby County and Citizens United,
this move allowed these five Justices to ignore inconvenient
facts, steer the decision toward its desired outcome, and write
broader opinions. 164
The Chief Justice and joint dissenters took for granted that the
government was forcing the plaintiffs unwillingly into a market in
which they otherwise would not have participated. In this way, these
five Justices assumed that the individual mandate was
unconstitutional as applied to everyone without health insurance.
But it is difficult to contend that Congress lacks the Commerce
Clause power to impose a mandate on health-care free riders. 165 To
the contrary, uninsured persons who receive but do not pay for

162. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 135, at 946 (noting that the Court could have held the
relevant BCRA provision invalid only as applied to the party before it, but instead it found the
provision invalid on its face).
163. By “uninsured non-free riders,” I refer to uninsured persons who do not pass their
health care costs onto society at large, either because they never consume health care or
because they are able to pay out of pocket for the health care costs they incur.
164. Admittedly, the Court ultimately upheld the mandate. See supra notes 103–04,
133–34 and accompanying text.
165. Probably for this reason, the challengers made sure to select plaintiffs who, though
uninsured, expected to be able to pay out of pocket for their health care needs. See, e.g.,
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1270–
71 (N.D. Fla. 2011).
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health care harm everyone else by passing their costs onto the rest of
society. Simply put, the free rider’s actions surely impacts interstate
commerce, especially in the aggregate. 166
The Chief Justice and joint dissenters completely ignored this
complication. 167 Indeed, they did not seek any assurance that the
plaintiffs would not free ride off the system. For example, these
Justices could have perhaps asked the plaintiffs to demonstrate that
they had not been free riders in the past and that they had the
savings to pay out of pocket for unexpected health care expenses.
Such an approach, though unwieldy, would at least have sought to
identify regulated individuals whose behavior did not substantially
affect interstate commerce.
The Chief Justice and joint dissenters, though, did not wrestle
with such problems, instead treating each uninsured person as
though she were entirely out of the health care market. 168 The Chief
Justice, indeed, brushed aside Congress’s claim that uninsured
people will consume health care as mere “prophesied future
activity.” 169 As noted above, this argument ignores congressional
findings indicating that every year many uninsured persons do
consume health care for which they do not pay. By ignoring this
evidence, the Chief Justice and joint dissenters could contend that
the individual mandate was beyond Congress’s commerce power in
all instances, even as applied to those free riders whose behavior
unquestionably impacts interstate commerce and partially prompted
the legislation in the first place. The Justices, in other words, treated

166. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (“That appellee’s own
contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that
of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”).
167. It is possible that these five Justices thought the individual mandate was
unconstitutional as applied to uninsured non-free riders and that this unconstitutional
application of the statute could not be severed from any constitutional applications of the
mandate. However, though these Justices engaged in a lengthy discussion of whether the
entire statute must fall due to the invalidity of the individual mandate and the Medicaid
expansion, they did not explore whether one could sever constitutional and unconstitutional
applications of the individual mandate. Compare NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08
(2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.), with id. at 2668–76 (joint dissent).
168. See id. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and
dissenting in part).
169. See id. at 2590 (majority opinion).
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the case as a facial challenge to all applications of the statute, rather
than an as-applied challenge by non-free riders (i.e., uninsured
persons with a plausible argument that they did not impact
interstate commerce).
In fairness, Commerce Clause challenges, such as United States v.
Lopez and United States v. Morrison, usually proceed facially. 170 To
that extent, the Court’s decision to treat the mandate challenge as a
facial one seems unremarkable. But NFIB differed in important
respects from both those cases. Both Lopez and Morrison emphasized
that the statutes at issue regulated non-economic activities (guns in
school zones and violence against women). 171 As a result, the Court
would not permit Congress to view these activities in the aggregate
as substantially affecting interstate commerce. 172 To this extent, the
statutes there were unconstitutional in all their applications.
By contrast, the argument that an uninsured person is not
engaged in economic activity is plausible only if that person never
seeks health care. If a person consumes health care without paying
for it, she is actively passing the costs of her health care consumption
onto the medical provider and, ultimately, society. Phrased
differently, such a free rider is actively engaged in economic activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce. By contrast, the man
who carries a gun into a school zone or who abuses his wife is simply
not engaged in economic activity (even if his activity may have
economic effects).
Given Lopez and Morrison’s reasoning, the Court’s decisions to
treat those cases as facial challenges make sense. No application of
either statute regulated economic activity. By contrast, the free rider is
plainly making an economic decision that impacts interstate
commerce. Accordingly, the Chief Justice’s and joint dissenters’
opinions must be read as asserting either that the existence of the
free rider is uncertain and therefore legally irrelevant, or that the

170. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–68 (1995); David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative
Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 62–68 (2006); Luke Meier, Facial
Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85 IND. L. J. 1557, 1563 (2010); Metzger, supra note
137, at 905.
171. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
172. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609–10; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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unconstitutional application of the mandate to some non-free riders
should sink the mandate’s constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause in all its applications. It is not entirely clear which argument
the Chief Justice and joint dissenters were advancing, but, either
way, these Justices treated the case as a facial challenge.
Even assuming arguendo that these five Justices were correct that
the mandate exceeded Congress’s authority as applied to uninsured
non-free riders, it is strange that that unconstitutional application
should invalidate the mandate in all its applications. Federal statutes
passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause are typically valid if they
regulate some economic activity substantially impacting interstate
commerce. 173 The Court historically has indicated it would uphold
statutes that, in some applications, may regulate activity that does
not affect interstate commerce. 174 Ever since 1937, the assumption
has been that so long as the statute in some regard regulates
economic behavior substantially affecting interstate commerce, the
statute would stand. 175
The five Justices in NFIB reversed this presumption, suggesting
(but not stating) that a statute enacted pursuant to the commerce
power must fall if some of its applications reach behavior not
implicating interstate commerce. This move made it possible for five
Justices to conclude that the mandate exceeded the commerce
power. It also allowed the Justices to ignore Congress’s findings that
the problem of free riders substantially affected interstate commerce.
Indeed, neither the Chief Justice nor the joint dissenters tried to
identify just how many people subject to the individual mandate
were, in fact, non-free riders. Presumably, a substantial portion of the
regulated individuals were or would soon become free riders whose
behavior impacts interstate commerce. Some people, in fact, forego
health insurance knowing that they soon will consume health care

173. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
174. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302–04 (1964) (upholding
application of Title II of the Civil Rights Act to a restaurant and rejecting the appellees’
contention that the Court should engage in a “case-by-case determination . . . that racial
discrimination in a particular restaurant affects commerce.”).
175. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. There is some disagreement about whether the test
should be whether the activity “affects” or “substantially affects” interstate commerce.
Compare id. at 559, with id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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for which they will be unable to pay. Congress itself had found that
very large numbers of Americans contribute to the very free-rider
problem Congress was trying to address, thus imposing enormous
costs on to the national economy. 176
Admittedly, it would have been difficult to distinguish ex ante
between free riders and uninsured persons who will not burden the
system. However, that difficulty should have cut in favor of the
mandate’s constitutionality. Given that the great number of free
riders substantially raised health care costs for everyone else, the
Chief Justice’s decision to focus exclusively on the non-free rider is
highly questionable. This approach effectively vindicated a facial
attack on the mandate, even though the legal argument applied
only to a subset (probably only a small subset) of the
regulated individuals.
***
It would be misleading to characterize the Court’s approach to
facial challenges here as plainly erroneous. After all, the Court not
infrequently
entertains
and
vindicates
facial
challenges,
notwithstanding its rhetoric that facial challenges ought to be rare. 177
What is more noticeable, though, is that the Court made this crucial
move in each opinion with minimal explanation and with no
acknowledgement that doing so excluded from the Court’s
consideration facts that reasonable observers might deem central to
the cases at hand.
The Chief Justice and joint dissenters in NFIB did not mention
the matter at all, discussing the mandate as though the constitutional
issue were identical for free riders and non-free riders alike. 178 The
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E)–(F) (2012).
177. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“A facial challenge to a
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.”); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1985); Michael C. Dorf, Facial
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 238 (1994) (pointing out that
the Supreme Court’s stated approach disfavoring facial challenges does not “accurately
reflect[] the Court’s practice”); Fallon, supra note 135, at 935; Metzger, supra note 137,
at 878 (“[T]he Court accepts facial challenges far more frequently than its stated
doctrine suggests.”).
178. See supra Section I.B.3.
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Court in Shelby County did not justify its decision to treat the case as
a facial challenge. 179 And though Citizens United tried to justify its
decision to convert the case into a facial challenge, 180 it failed to
explain convincingly why it ought not remand the case for fact
finding about the statute’s effects.
The apparent allure of facial challenges in these cases was not just
that they enabled the Justices to weave around inconvenient facts,
but also that they enabled the Justices to write broader opinions than
would have otherwise been possible. 181 Indeed, this judicial
aggrandizement is consistent with other moves in these cases
enhancing the Justices’ power. In NFIB, for example, the Chief
Justice need not have discussed the Commerce Clause issue at all,
given that it upheld the individual mandate under Congress’s taxing
power. 182 Citizens United need not have reached the facial
constitutional issue, given that it could have been decided on narrow
statutory grounds or as an as-applied constitutional challenge. 183
Indeed, in that case, the Court requested additional briefing and
rescheduled oral argument precisely to inject into the case a
broad First Amendment issue. 184 To this extent, the Court’s
treatment of facts and facial challenges in these cases is part of a
broader pattern of aggressive judicial efforts to issue far-reaching
constitutional decisions.
II. EXPLANATIONS
The Court’s avoidance of inconvenient facts in these cases
is striking. One would think that the Justices would at least want to
consider the facts motivating federal legislation, even if they
ultimately deemed those facts insufficient to support the statute at
179. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2644–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC 558 U.S. 310, 329–30 (2010).
181. Cf. Metzger, supra note 137, at 880 (arguing that the Justices “are less concerned
with” treating the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges consistently and more
concerned “with results in particular cases”).
182. See supra Section I.A.3.
183. See Briffault, supra note 93, at 663 (noting “several legal theories” that would have
permitted Citizens United to pay for the movie in question that would not have required the
Court to invalidate laws banning corporate campaign spending).
184. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 322 (directing parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing constitutional questions).
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issue. After all, core constitutional doctrines, like ripeness and
standing, are premised partially on the notion that judges decide
cases more wisely when they have concrete disputes with developed
facts in front of them. 185
To the extent the majority in each of these cases found creative
ways to decide important constitutional cases without considering
seemingly relevant facts, it is important to explore why the Justices
act as they do. It is worth noting that no single explanation for the
Court’s approach is fully satisfactory, and some apply to some cases
more convincingly than to others. Nevertheless, collectively the
various explanations examined here help shed light on the practice
and the Court’s constitutional decision making more generally.
A. The Doctrinal Explanation: (Novel) Constitutional First Principles
Perhaps the most obvious explanation behind the Court’s
aggressive avoidance of facts, including congressional facts, is that
the Court cared more about deeper constitutional norms and less
about the facts prompting congressional policy. In each case here,
the Court’s analysis largely sidestepped facts, instead focusing on
what the majority perceived to be constitutional first principles.
Interestingly, these principles were deeply contested and, in some
cases, wholly novel. Nevertheless, these principles were very much at
the heart of the majority Justices’ theories of these cases.
Citizens United presents the most obvious example—and the one
example in which the principle in question already was important in
the case law. The Court rejected the relevance of Congress’s findings
that corporate campaign finance contributions can lead to an undue
and corrupting corporate influence over the political process.186
Only quid pro quo corruption, the Court said, mattered for free
speech purposes. 187

185. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 471–72
(2008) (summarizing views of the functions of standing); Fallon, supra note 135, at 960.
186. See supra Section I.A.2.
187. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption,
that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”).
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While the Court cited Buckley for this proposition, 188 a fuller
explanation rests with the Court’s understanding of representative
democracy. Quoting his own opinion from McConnell, Justice
Kennedy explained:
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative
politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor
certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and
contributors who support those policies. It is well understood that
a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a
vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another
is that the candidate will respond by producing those
political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised
189
on responsiveness.

The Court’s vision of representative democracy, then, accepts
rent seeking and speech supporting it as inevitable features of our
governmental system. On this view, Congress’s evidence that
campaign contributions “corrupt,” established only what Justice
Kennedy deemed inherent in our governmental system. Many
businesses and other interest groups contribute to political
candidates precisely because they hope that those candidates, if
elected, will pass laws favorable to those contributors. Far from
lamenting this state of affairs, the Court accepted it as inevitable.190
Accordingly, no congressional findings short of quid pro quo
corruption could justify regulations that so substantially impinged on
campaign contributors’ First Amendment interests.
Shelby County’s attitude toward congressional facts also rested on
constitutional first principles. The Court began with the proposition
that state sovereignty generally, and equal state sovereignty in
particular, are constitutional principles of the highest importance.191
Building on this premise, the majority insisted that only

188. See id.
189. Id. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010)).
190. See Sitkoff, supra note 81, at 1106.
191. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013) (describing the VRA as “a
drastic departure from basic principles of federalism” and “an equally dramatic departure from
the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty”).
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extraordinary circumstances could justify intruding on these
principles. The Court accepted that the VRA’s “strong medicine”
may once have been necessary to combat the insidious practice of
voter discrimination but insisted that it was constitutionally
illegitimate absent “exceptional conditions.” 192 Whereas the Jim
Crow South’s blatant voter discrimination, which often prevented
African Americans from casting ballots at all, rose to this level, 193
more subtle and contemporary forms of voter discrimination
did not. 194
The Court’s point was not that these barriers did not exist.
Rather, the Court assumed that these barriers were not as serious as
they had been when Congress first passed the VRA in 1965.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that whatever the factual record, it
could not support Congress’s intrusion on state sovereignty.
Additionally, the Court’s opinion rested on the latent but
palpable principle of color blindness. During oral argument, the
majority Justices signaled that they saw the VRA as a racial
entitlement—that is, as a governmental benefit bestowed upon racial
minorities (and, in particular, African Americans). 195 Some Justices,
thus, signaled that a statute that treated states differently and
extended special protections to certain racial minorities was
unconstitutional absent especially robust findings. The constitutional
bar, in fact, was so high that the Court did not even need to look at
the evidence to conclude that it was not good enough. 196
Like Shelby County, NFIB’s Commerce Clause analysis also
ignored congressional facts in service of federalism. The Chief
Justice, for instance, quoting The Federalist No. 48, openly worried
that without a firm judicial check on Congress, the federal legislature
would be “everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and
192.
193.

Id. at 2618.
See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966); MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 52–55, 85–86 (2004).
194. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109–478, at 6 (2006).
195. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. 2612
(No. 1296).
196. See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (“Regardless of how to look at the record . . . no
one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’
and ‘rampant’ discrimination . . . in 1965.”).
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drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.” 197 The joint dissenters
similarly contended that “if every person comes within the
Commerce Clause power of Congress to regulate by the simple
reason that he will one day engage in commerce, the idea of a
limited Government power is at an end.” 198
This federalism principle dictated that Congress’s findings should
not matter. Because Congress had relied on its findings about the
serious economic consequences of uninsured persons to justify an
unprecedented exercise of its commerce authority, 199 these Justices
recharacterized the very phenomenon Congress regulated as
“inaction.” Given the federalism principles at stake, both the Chief
Justice and the joint dissenters indicated that they would not accept
a characterization of the facts that would permit Congress such
broad commerce power.
In one sense, these judicial statements were candid admissions
that a normative constitutional preference for limited federal
government was pushing aside seemingly key facts. 200 That candor,
however, can be understood also as an acknowledgement that these
Justices—and the joint dissenters in particular—were prepared to
characterize the facts however necessary to hold that the individual
mandate exceeded the commerce power. On that account, it didn’t
really matter whether Congress regulated behavior that substantially
affected interstate commerce, because five Justices believed
Congress shouldn’t be regulating in that way, regardless of the
underlying facts.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Court’s constitutional
justifications for ignoring Congress’s facts in these cases rested on
novel or, at best, deeply contested constitutional theories. For
example, the distinction between action and inaction did not exist in
Commerce Clause doctrine prior to NFIB. The Chief Justice
justified this innovation by contending that “[a]llowing Congress to
justify federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on

197. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison)).
198. Id. at 2648 (joint dissent).
199. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F) (2012).
200. See infra Section IV.B.2.
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commerce would bring countless decisions an individual could
potentially make within the scope of federal regulation.” 201
However, this distinction between action and inaction is largely
arbitrary. 202 As Justice Ginsburg, quoting Judge Easterbrook, noted,
“it is possible to restate most actions as corresponding inactions with
the same effect.” 203 As already discussed, while the Chief Justice and
the joint dissenters painted a person’s failure to purchase health
insurance as “inaction,” one could just as easily characterize it as an
affirmative decision to impose one’s own medical expenses onto
hospitals and society more generally.
Even more to the point, this doctrinal distinction did not exist
prior to NFIB and is, in fact, in tension with earlier Commerce
Clause cases. 204 Moreover, even if we accept the distinction, the
Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to enact measures
“plainly adapted” to accomplish Congress’s legitimate goals. 205 ACA
provisions forbidding insurance companies from denying coverage or
charging higher prices to individuals with preexisting medical
conditions plainly fall within the Commerce power. 206 Without the
individual mandate, however, those provisions would never work.207
The individual mandate, then, was “‘reasonably adapted’ to the
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power” 208 and,
therefore, valid under Necessary and Proper Clause precedent.
The Chief Justice steered around this precedent on the theory
that the individual mandate was not “proper,” because it interfered

201. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
202. See David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act,
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20.
203. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (quoting Archie v. Racine, 847 F. 2d 1211, 1213
(7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
204. See Strauss, supra note 202, at 20–23 (discussing Wickard and other early
Commerce Clause cases); supra Sections I.A.3, I.B.3.
205. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); Strauss, supra
note 202, at 9.
206. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2626 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
207. See id. (explaining adverse selection problem that would arise if the guaranteed issue
and community rating provisions were unaccompanied by the individual mandate).
208. See id. (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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with the “structure of government.” 209 However, as Justice Ginsburg
explained, the Chief Justice cited just two cases for this proposition,
both of which were easily distinguishable, because, unlike the
individual mandate, they compelled state officials to act on behalf of
the federal government. 210 Regardless of whether it is persuasive, the
Chief Justice’s approach charts new constitutional territory. The
Chief Justice’s rejection of congressional facts in NFIB, then, is all
the more notable, because it rested upon newfangled doctrine.
Shelby County, too, rejected facts based primarily on new
doctrine. While the Court had cited the principle of equal state
sovereignty before, that concept had rested dormant for much of our
constitutional history. 211 Furthermore, that constitutional principle
was often narrow, only requiring Congress to admit new states on
the same terms as the original thirteen states. 212 Thus, as Professor
Litman argues, “Shelby County broadened the equal sovereignty
principle beyond how it had been used in prior cases.” 213 The Court,
for its part, cited its 2009 decision in Northwest Austin Municipal
Utility District v. Holder, 214 but in that case the Court found that the
jurisdiction in question was eligible to seek bailout from preclearance
obligations. 215 The Court, therefore, decided Northwest Austin as a
matter of statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation.
Though Northwest Austin discussed the equal state sovereignty
principle, that principle did not decide the case.
Finally, while Citizens United’s narrow view of corruption was
already part of First Amendment doctrine, the majority opinion was
also at odds with important First Amendment precedents and
historical understandings. 216 Cases like Austin v. Michigan Chamber

209. See id. at 2592 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
210. See id. at 2627 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (discussing Chief Justice’s analysis of New York v. United States
and Printz v. United States).
211. See Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1228–
29 (2016).
212. See id. at 1211.
213. Id.
214. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
215. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009).
216. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 395 (2010); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
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of Commerce 217 and McConnell v. FEC 218 had upheld campaign
finance restrictions, including (in McConnell’s case) the very BCRA
provision at issue in Citizens United. 219 Unlike Citizens United, those
cases had wrestled explicitly with the government interest in
campaign finance regulation. 220
Similarly, FEC v. National Right to Work Commission had also
unanimously recognized a sufficient governmental interest in
“ensur[ing] that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by”
corporations would not “be used to incur political debts from
legislators who are aided by the contributions.” 221 That case had
likewise accepted that Congress’s decision to place special limitations
on corporations’ campaign spending “reflects a permissible
assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the electoral
process.” 222 Thus, as Justice Stevens argued in dissent in Citizens
United, the majority’s approach overruled or disavowed a long line
of case law upholding campaign finance regulations. 223
The Court’s willingness to accept corporate rent-seeking also
ignored concerns about the dangers of corruption dating back to the
Founding era. As Professor Teachout argues, the United States,
throughout its history, has a tradition of viewing corruption broadly
(1990). See generally ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 2 (2014) (discussing
deep concerns about corruption, broadly defined, in American history); Zephyr Teachout, The
Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 342 (2009) (“The Constitution carries
within it an anti-corruption principle, much like the separation-of-powers principle,
or federalism.”).
217. Austin, 494 U.S. 652.
218. McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
219. Admittedly, the rationale in Austin was somewhat different from that asserted by
the government to defend the statute at issue in Citizens United. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660
(“[T]he corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form . . . that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”).
220. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (“We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at
‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s
support for the corporation’s political ideas.’” (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660)).
221. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm’n, 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982).
222. Id. at 209.
223. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 395 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); FEC
v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981)).
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to include not only “blatant bribes and theft from the public till . . .
[but also] many situations where politicians and public institutions
serve private interests at the public’s expense.” 224 This type of antirent-seeking principle, arguably baked into the Constitution in
provisions like the Emoluments Clause, 225 calls into question the
majority’s assumptions about representative democracy under the
Constitution. While the depth and scope of this anti-corruption
principle is certainly contestable, 226 its very existence raises questions
about whether the Court’s preferred constitutional first principle was
necessarily correct.
Of course, just because the majority relied on novel or deeply
contested constitutional principles in these cases does not necessarily
mean that those principles are wrong. New doctrines sometimes
become canonical. Nevertheless, it is striking that the Court’s efforts
to avoid grappling with inconvenient facts relied largely on
doctrinal innovations. 227
Indeed, the majority’s willingness to brush aside these facts in
the service of new or deeply contested constitutional doctrine
suggests that the Justices here are guided less by constitutional
precedent and more by the spirit of innovation. The Court’s
aggressive rejection of Congress’s facts—and its related confidence in
its own view of the world—speak, then, not to passive jurists
applying clear legal principles to the case before them, but rather to
Justices aggressively moving the law in their preferred directions. 228
The Court may have hoped to seem apolitical when it ignored the

224. See TEACHOUT, supra note 216, at 2.
225. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or
Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of Congress, accept of any present, Emolument,
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”); NORMAN L.
EISEN ET AL., GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: ITS TEXT,
MEANING, AND APPLICATION TO DONALD J. TRUMP 5 (2016), https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emoluments-clause1.pdf (arguing that the
Emoluments Clause was a broad “anti-corruption measure”).
226. See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s
Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399, 404–17 (2012) (arguing that the
Founders were not “obsessed” with corruption and that the anti-corruption principle extends
not to elected federal positions but only to appointed federal officers).
227. See also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Morrison
v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
228. See generally ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS (2012).
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facts and focused on constitutional principles, but its disregard of
inconvenient facts instead suggests deep commitment to an
ideological agenda.
B. The Political Explanation: The Conservative Counter Revolution
We thus turn to a second and closely related explanation:
political norms. In each of the cases discussed here, a conservative
majority of the Court voted to invalidate parts of federal statutes
serving progressive agendas. As Professor Karlan has argued, whereas
conservatives once advocated for judicial restraint as a reaction
against the perceived excesses of the Warren Court, judicial
conservatives in more recent years have used the judicial power to
attack constitutional doctrines undergirding liberal legislative
accomplishments. 229 This is not a judicial conservatism devoted to
the passive virtues of judicial modesty, 230 but a far more aggressive
conservatism that promotes the Republican Party’s agenda through
court decisions. 231
Of course, politics alone cannot explain constitutional law, and
the media sometimes over-emphasizes political factors when it
reports on judicial decisions. Nevertheless, it is striking that the
majority Justices on these issues—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito—were all appointed by
Republican presidents. 232 By contrast, the dissenters—Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—were all appointed by
Democratic presidents and predictably share more liberal tendencies.
Only the Republican-appointed Justice Stevens, who wrote the
dissent in Citizens United shortly before retiring, took a position
that departed from the likely preferences of the party of the
appointing President (and Stevens was appointed by President Ford,
a very moderate Republican by contemporary standards). 233

229. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 10.
230. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term–Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
231. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 11, 70.
232. As noted above, though NFIB ultimately upheld the individual mandate, the five
conservative Justices comprised the majority on the Commerce Clause issue.
233. Of course, the Chief Justice’s vote to uphold the individual mandate on Taxing
Clause grounds also departed from Republican Party preferences. Similarly, Justices Breyer’s
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Given this stark divide, it should not be surprising that the
decisions here can be seen as conservative in both constitutional and
political terms. In constitutional terms, as just discussed, each
opinion vindicated constitutional principles generally associated with
conservative thought. 234 In crasser political terms, the opinions also
plausibly could be understood to serve conservative ends. The
majority of jurisdictions subject to VRA preclearance leaned
Republican, 235 and preclearance sometimes blocked changes to
voting procedures that would have likely harmed Democratic
candidates. 236 Perhaps predictably, shortly after Shelby County, North
Carolina enacted a vote-suppression law, which likely limited the
right to vote among low income and minority voters, who tend to
vote more Democratic. 237 While litigation under section 2 of the
VRA may discourage (or even halt) some other state-wide votesuppression efforts, 238 the absence of pre-clearance is probably more
apparent in local jurisdictions, where vote-suppression receives less
attention and is more likely to fly under the radar. 239 As a result,
localities can more easily make changes to voting rules, which

and Kagan’s votes on the Spending Clause issue in NFIB departed from Democratic Party
preferences. As these examples demonstrate, we ought not overstate the effect of political
preferences on judicial decision making.
234. See supra Section II.A.
235. See Editors, Leave the Voting Rights Act Alone, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 12, 2015),
http://www.nationalreview.com/node/422408/print (stating that the jurisdictions that had
been subject to preclearance, though originally Democratic in the 1960s, were by the 2000s
mostly in heavily Republican states).
236. See id. (stating that the preclearance requirements generally would be more likely to
help Democrats today); Heather Gerken, Opting into the Voting Rights Act,
REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/30/optinginto-the-voting-rights-act.
237. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 72 (2014); Jamie Fuller, How Has Voting Changed Since Shelby
County v. Holder?, WASH. POST (July 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2014/07/07/how-has-voting-changed-since-shelby-county-v-holder/?utm_term
=. 272394194f7a; Theodore R. Johnson, Why Are African-Americans Such Loyal Democrats
When They Are So Ideologically Diverse?, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/28/can-trump-win-black-vote
s-what-we-know-from-5-decades-of-black-voting-data/?utm_term=.4caf7f19281f.
238. See Kathleen M. Stoughton, Note, A New Approach to Voter ID Challenges: Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 292 (2013) (discussing the possibility of
section 2 voting rights litigation).
239. See Tokaji, supra note 237, at 72.
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previously would have been subject to preclearance. Such changes
likely dilute minority voting power. 240 While the complete effects of
the decision are complicated and difficult to measure, Shelby County,
as a political matter, likely favored Republicans more
than Democrats. 241
Citizens United also seems to help conservative causes. While
both Democratic and Republican candidates can benefit from
corporate independent expenditures, corporations sometimes make
such expenditures hoping that their candidate, if elected, will
decrease burdensome regulations. 242 The Republican Party, of
course, generally champions deregulation. It therefore should not be
surprising that fundraising rules post-Citizens United may often
favor Republicans. 243 Additionally, while unions theoretically enjoy
the same ability as corporations to spend general treasury funds to
influence elections under the Citizens United framework, unions face
additional constraints that corporations don’t because union dues

240. See id. at 72 (“[P]reclearance was most effective in curbing redistricting plans and
other practices thought to weaken minority representation . . . .”); Jon Greenbaum et al.,
Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes Irrational, 57 HOW. L.J. 811, 822
(2014) (noting that Congress determined repeatedly in the decades after 1965 that section 5
of the VRA “was still needed because of efforts to dilute minority voting strength”); Keesha
M. Middlemass, The Need to Resurrect Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 J. CIVIL
RIGHTS & ECON. DEV. 61, 102 (2015).
241. See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 231 (2016)
(classifying Shelby County as ideologically conservative); Tokaji, supra note 237, at 76 (“The
conventional wisdom is that these [voting] laws will hurt Democrats more than
Republicans.”); Vann R. Newkirk II, The Battle for North Carolina, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 27,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/the-battle-for-north-carolina
/501257 (stating that immediately after Shelby County, North Carolina Republicans began
passing laws restricting voting access for minorities).
242. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1559 (2005) (“Enron developed its political capital—making large
political contributions and building relationships with state and federal government officials—
in order to obtain regulatory changes that would enable it to build its energy
trading market.”).
243. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
283, 285–86 (2014) (noting that Republicans enjoyed a “substantial financial edge” in the
2012 election); Anu Narayanswamy et al., Money Raised as of Dec. 31, WASH. POST, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/campaign-finance/ (stating that
for the candidates other than Trump and Clinton, 13% of the Democratic funding was from
super PACs and other independent groups and 33% of the Republican funding was from these
groups) (last updated Feb. 1, 2017).
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payments make up much of their treasury funds. 244 The result is an
asymmetry that favors corporations over unions. 245
The conservatives in NFIB, too, favored a politically conservative
outcome, attacking the Obama administration’s most important
policy accomplishment. Of course, the Court ended up upholding
most of the law, including the controversial individual mandate.
However, the Court did invalidate a portion of the statute extending
Medicaid to more individuals, essentially rendering that provision
optional for states. 246 Moreover, even in upholding the individual
mandate, the Chief Justice fired a warning shot across Congress’s
bow. 247 Indeed, by upholding the mandate on taxing, rather than
commerce, grounds, the Chief Justice may have limited Congress’s
regulatory authority. Taxes, after all, are politically unpopular. 248
To be clear, the point here is not to accuse the Justices of
consciously deciding cases to advance political goals. Empirical
studies typically conclude that judges do not have conscious political
goals. 249 The Justices do not think of themselves as politicians, and
there certainly were plausible legal arguments in favor of the Court’s
outcomes in each of these cases. Nevertheless, it is striking that the
Justices who disregarded facts undergirding the legislation were all
appointed by presidents of the party more likely to oppose the
policies at issue. 250 Indeed, as we shall see, political preferences likely
filter into Justices’ unconscious biases. To this extent, politics
probably drives the Justices’ decision-making more than they realize.

244. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 40 (describing limitations on unions’ ability to spend
general treasury funds to influence elections).
245. See id.
246. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
247. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 47 (describing Chief Justice Roberts’ NFIB opinion as
“probably the most grudging opinion ever to uphold a major piece of legislation”).
248. See David Orentlicher, Constitutional Challenges to the Health Care Mandate: Based
in Politics, Not Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 19, 29 (2011).
249. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 25 (2008) (summarizing
empirical studies noting that no attitudinal study demonstrates that “judges have conscious
political goals”).
250. See id. at 22–23 (noting that studies show that the political inclinations of judges
invariably “explain much of the variance in judges’ votes on politically charged issues”).
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C. The Psychological Explanation: Motivated Reasoning and
Cultural Cognition
Psychological research helps deepen our understanding of the
doctrinal and political explanations. Whether or not they realize it,
the Justices’ background assumptions and normative views inevitably
shape their perceptions of the relevance of facts. 251 Like people more
generally, the Justices are subject to motivated reasoning—that is, to
the unconscious tendency of individuals to process information in a
manner more likely to reinforce existing beliefs than to form accurate
ones. 252 Thus, the Justices will naturally deem relevant those facts
confirming their own worldview or vindicating their preferred
constitutional principles. As the social psychologist Ziva Kunda
explains, “when one wants to draw a particular conclusion, one feels
obligated to construct a justification for that conclusion that would
be plausible to a dispassionate observer. In doing so, one accesses
only a biased subset of the relevant beliefs and rules.” 253
Professor Kahan has explored the related phenomenon of
cultural cognition, which “refers to the tendency of individuals to
conform their perceptions of risk and other policy-consequential
facts to their cultural worldviews.” 254 He argues persuasively that
individuals are likely to seek out information that supports positions
and groups they normatively favor. 255 According to Professor Kahan
and other scholars, Supreme Court Justices are hardly immune from
this phenomenon. 256
The Justices’ background normative assumptions, cultural
identities, and political views, then, likely played a role, perhaps even
a substantial one, in their attitudes toward congressional and other

251. Cf. SEGALL, supra note 228, at 6.
252. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term–Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19
(2011); Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 490–
91 (1990).
253. Kunda, supra note 252, at 493.
254. Kahan, supra note 252, at 23.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 20; Gerald N. Rosenberg, Incentives, Reputation, and the Glorious
Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 637 (2000).
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facts. 257 The Justices are sophisticated actors, so they are probably
less inclined to embrace fake facts than many members of the public.
That said, the Justices’ ideological predispositions likely shape their
attitudes toward particular factual propositions.
In each of these cases, a conservative majority of Justices rejected
statutory provisions that impinged on conservative values. In each
case, the more liberal Justices would have sustained the challenged
portions of the legislation. From this perspective, the Court may
have rejected Congress’s facts because they were inconvenient
obstacles to a conservative outcome the majority wanted to reach.
Similarly, the more liberal Justices may have been more inclined to
accept Congress’s facts because they helped support the outcome
they were inclined to reach anyway. 258
Background norms and political preferences, then, are necessarily
part of judicial decision-making. 259 To be sure, professional judgment
and legal training can help counter-act the pull of cognitive biases.260
That said, while most judges follow clear law when it exists,
Supreme Court cases often present difficult issues about which
reasonable people can disagree. 261 After all, many issues before the
Supreme Court divide lower courts. 262 Moreover, Supreme Court
constitutional cases, in particular, often offer little in the way of clear
doctrine to cabin judicial discretion. 263 Most Justices do not ignore
the law to further their own political views, but it is natural and
probably inevitable that a Justice’s “priors,” as Judge Posner calls

257. See Kahan, supra note 252, at 19 (describing “the unconscious tendency of
individuals to process information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to the
formation of accurate beliefs”).
258. See Devins, supra note 13, at 1175 (“Justices sympathetic to the goals of a
particular statute, if not Congress itself, typically see the issue before them as one of fact;
Justices skeptical of Congress, in contrast, are more apt to see the issue as one of law.”).
259. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 13, at 2030 (noting that Court’s treatment of the
legislative record “seemed to rest on whether they believed the evidence supporting the law in
the first place”).
260. See Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental
Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349,
354 (2016).
261. See POSNER, supra note 249, at 274.
262. See U.S. SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing splits among U.S. court of appeals and/or state
high courts as important factors to consider in decision about whether to grant certiorari).
263. See POSNER, supra note 249, at 274.
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them, 264 will color the way she sees a contested legal question. 265 In
these cases, those leanings likely colored the Justices’ views of the
relevance of Congress’s facts.
D. The Practical Explanation: The Opinion-Writing Process
Related to the psychological explanation is the opinion-writing
process. Justices’ decisions about what to include and exclude from
their opinions are, for better or worse, often driven by the Justices’
understandable desire to draft a coherent, persuasive opinion.
Sometimes, Justices conceal factors because they realize that
addressing those factors “will not write.” 266
To this extent, some Justices may sometimes downplay or
altogether ignore facts that other Justices deem central to a case. 267
These moves may be conscious decisions to steer around
inconvenient evidence, but they may also sometimes be quite
unconscious attempts to defend the preferred outcome as
persuasively as possible. 268 As I have explained elsewhere, it is pithier
to dismiss the relevance of certain facts categorically than to explain
why, on balance, those facts should not guide the outcome given the
context of a case. 269 To this extent, the phenomenon explored here
may partially be a product of the writing process as Justices seek to
write an opinion that sounds convincing, even if upon closer
inspection, that opinion dodges some crucial facts and arguments.

264. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court Is a Political Court. Republicans’ Actions
Are Proof, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thesupreme-court-is-a-political-court-republicans-actions-are-proof/2016/03/09/4c851860-e1
42-11e5-8d98-4b3d9215ade1_story.html (“Priors are what we bring to a new question before
we’ve had a chance to do research on it. They are attitudes, presuppositions derived from
upbringing, from training, from personal and career experience, from religion and national
origin and character and ideology and politics.”).
265. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998);
POSNER, supra note 249, at 269; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological
Values and the Votes of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995).
266. See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function,
96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1321 (2008) [hereinafter Oldfather, Writing].
267. See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 723.
268. See CARL BEREITER & MARLENE SCARDAMALIA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WRITTEN
COMPOSITION 132 (1987); Oldfather, Writing, supra note 266, at 1308.
269. See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 723.
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The Court’s approach to facts, then, may sometimes be part of a
larger phenomenon in which the Justices often make constitutional
cases seem easier than they really are. 270
Relatedly, the writing process forces the author to address only
her key points. 271 Justices must make decisions about which facts to
discuss and which to exclude. This process necessarily involves
simplifications; a written opinion cannot fully capture the world’s
true complexity (and many Supreme Court opinions are too long as
it is). 272 Sometimes, these simplifications are uncontroversial, because
they dispense with facts that no decent lawyer or judge would
consider relevant. However, sometimes in the attempt to write a
more concise opinion, Justices shortchange facts that others would
consider important or even crucial. 273
Of course, this explanation does not work equally well for every
case. For example, it does not adequately explain the Chief Justice’s
approach to facts in the Commerce Clause section of NFIB. It would
have been far easier for the Chief Justice to dispense with the
Commerce Clause analysis altogether, given his decision to uphold
the mandate on Taxing Clause grounds. In this case, then, other
explanations, such as constitutional first principles, are more
persuasive. That said, this factor likely explains other cases, including
Shelby County and Citizens United, which would have been more
complicated opinions had the majority reached the same outcome
while grappling thoroughly with facts it discarded.
E. The Legalist Explanation: A Lack of Rules
Another explanation is that no rules constrain appellate courts’
approaches to congressional findings or other kinds of legislative
facts. 274 Accordingly, judges and especially Supreme Court Justices

270. See generally id.
271. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and
the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 157 (2005).
272. See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 724.
273. Cf. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 150 (1976); Robert
A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 206–
07 (1990).
274. See Gorod, supra note 10, at 57 (noting the “absence of established procedures” to
guide courts’ approaches to legislative fact disputes).
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are free to make assumptions about the relevance and content of
various facts based on their own normative preferences,
constitutional commitments, background knowledge, amicus brief
perusal, and independent research. 275 The Justices, in fact, can credit
or discard these kinds of facts without having to check those
assumptions against a trial court record, congressional findings,
administrative agency facts, academic literature, or anything else.
There is no law there.
By contrast, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern judicial notice
of adjudicative facts. 276 Standards of appellate review similarly guide
appellate consideration of trial court findings. 277 In administrative
law, the Administrative Procedure Act governs judicial review of
various agency actions and factual findings. 278 In each of these cases,
black-letter law guides judicial consideration of certain kinds of facts.
In reality, the rules can be quite malleable, but judges, lawyers, and
governmental officials all cite the governing standards and at least
ostensibly try to follow them.
No such rules govern Supreme Court review of congressional
facts or its treatment of the distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges. Even more importantly, no rules require—or plausibly
could require—the Court to explain how it decided which facts are
legally relevant. Though the Court has often obscured the line
between legal and factual conclusions, the decision about which facts
“count” is essentially a legal one. To this extent, even were the
Court to accept presumptively the veracity of Congress’s factual
findings, it would still enjoy substantial leeway to decide the legal
relevance of those facts.

275. See id.; Allison Orr Larsen, Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf Life?, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 59, 83–86 (2015) [hereinafter, Larsen, Shelf Life]; Larsen, Amicus Facts, supra note 12,
at 1778; Larsen, supra note 10, at 1280–85.
276. See generally FED. R. EVID. 201(a); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems
of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942); Faigman,
supra note 21, at 162.
277. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).
278. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (stipulating scope of review for court reviewing
agency actions).
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F. The Institutional Explanation: Mistrust of Congress and the Allure
of Judicial Supremacy
A final explanation is that the Court sometimes distrusts
Congress and, hence, its facts. Sometimes this distrust is justified.
Though Congress has substantial resources to gather and sort
information, 279 it does not always make use of those institutional
advantages. 280 Sometimes, instead, Congress makes “factual” findings
without studying a problem closely. 281 In such cases, Congress’s
“facts” may actually be naked partisan statements devoid of
empirical support. 282
The Court, indeed, may suspect sometimes that Congress has
made ostensibly empirical findings in bad faith. For example,
Congress sometimes points to evidence that conveniently—and
suspiciously—fits the legal test for constitutionally controversial
legislation. 283 If the legislature’s use of facts is cynical, then the Court
may believe that its findings are neither impartial nor empirical but
rather the political preferences of the majority dressed up
as evidence. 284
Cognizant of these concerns, the Court may often be disinclined
to accept the legal relevance of Congress’s findings. 285 Indeed,
Justices may think it easier to brush aside questionable evidence as a
279. Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection, and the Problem with Plebiscites,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 578 (1994); see also F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption
of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1473 (2010) (noting Congress’s access to
the Congressional Research Service that can help facilitate factual findings).
280. See Berger, Deference Determinations, supra note 17, at 501.
281. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 13, at 1182.
282. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165–66 (2007) (noting that Congress
found that partial birth abortions are never medically necessary despite medical testimony to
the contrary); Araiza, supra note 13, at 919–20.
283. See generally Araiza, supra note 13, at 913–19; Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age
of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479, 492–93 (2012).
284. The phenomenon is hardly limited to the cases explored here. See, e.g., Whole
Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016); Linda Greenhouse, The Courts
Begin to Call Out Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
08/18/opinion/the-courts-begin-to-call-out-lawmakers.html?emc=eta1&_r=0 (noting that
the Court has appeared more willing “to call out legislatures for what they are doing, not just
what they say they are doing”).
285. See Ross, supra note 13, at 2031–32 (“In entire categories of cases, the Court
questions whether the state’s record can be believed as a complete and unbiased presentation
of evidence related to the constitutionality of the law . . . .”).
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matter of law than to question openly it as a matter of fact.
Additionally, even when the Court does trust Congress’s facts, it
bears no obligation to accept those facts’ constitutional relevance.
The Court, protective of its own institutional mission, may well
think that its prerogative to determine constitutional meaning would
be substantially reduced were it required to accept both the veracity
and the legal relevance of Congress’s facts.
The Court’s mistrust of Congress may also arise from important
differences between the legislative and judicial institutions. The
Justices themselves have little actual political experience and almost
no legislative experience. None of the Justices participating in these
cases ever held elected office, and only Justice Breyer worked in
Congress (as Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee). 286
The Justices’ lack of familiarity with the inner workings of Congress
might contribute to their lack of trust and sympathy for
that institution.
Perhaps even more fundamentally, the Court’s kind of work
differs dramatically from Congress’s. Supreme Court Justices are
usually top-notch lawyers—intelligent, meticulous, and analytical.
Though some have crafted public personas, the Justices need not
return home regularly to address their constituents. Most would
likely agree that the Justices should not bring a political agenda to
their work. 287
Congressional representatives, by contrast, must constantly speak
to the public about their policy preferences. Whereas most judges
value analytical precision, representatives often speak in sound bites
and glib generalities. The Justices, then, may distrust Congress
in part because judges and politicians value very different
professional qualities.
From that perspective, the Justices may see legislatures (or other
institutions) injecting their own normative biases into their factual
findings. In such cases, Justices may think that they should not
credit such naked partisanship. These cases, then, may reflect the
286. See Laura Krugman Ray, The Legacy of a Supreme Court Clerkship: Stephen Breyer
and Arthur Goldberg, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 83, 109 (2010).
287. See Stephen M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics into
Mayonnaise, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 58 (2014) (“Some Supreme Court justices agree
that law and politics must remain separate.”).
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Justices’ own self-confidence that they can sniff out bogus
factual assertions. 288
Relatedly, these cases reflect the Justices’ comfort with their own
supremacy over questions of constitutional law. 289 If Congress could
demonstrate the constitutionality of controversial legislation merely
by pointing to facts ostensibly justifying the law, the Court’s power
of judicial review would be substantially diminished. The Court’s
penchant for rejecting congressional facts as irrelevant, then, speaks
to its interest in retaining the primary authority to decide questions
of constitutional law.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court’s rejection of congressional facts, though
normatively troubling, is not inherently constitutionally illegitimate.
After all, Article III vests the Supreme Court with “appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact.” 290 Indeed, questions of law and
fact can be hard to untangle. As Alexander Hamilton explained in
Federalist 83, “Though the proper province of juries be to determine
matters of fact, yet in most cases legal consequences are complicated
with fact in such a matter as to render a separation impracticable.” 291
That said, the Court’s disregard for congressional findings and
other facts has important implications. This part explores those
implications for both constitutional doctrine and our separation of
powers. It begins with an examination of the doctrinal questions the
Court left unresolved. It then turns to broader institutional
implications and the status of facts in our society more generally.
A. Doctrinal Puzzles and the Relationship Between Law and Fact
The Court’s approach to facts in these cases leaves open
important doctrinal questions. The questions are themselves

288. See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 671; Karlan, supra note 81, at 68 (noting
that the Justices’ confidence that they can deliver constitutional “right answers” “may reinforce
Justices’ sense of their superiority”).
289. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
290. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
291. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
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important, as they result in legal uncertainty in important areas of
constitutional law. Collectively, however, they also help demonstrate
that the Court’s approaches to congressional findings in these cases
can inject even more uncertainty into already under-determinate
areas of law. 292
More precisely, while these cases indicate that facts may matter
less than we are used to thinking, the Court does not tell us when
they do matter. Indeed, the Court’s approach was decidedly muddy,
making it difficult to separate law from fact. 293 As a result, it is hard
to measure the precedential impact of the decisions themselves. A
lower court in future cases likely enjoys substantial discretion to
claim that the Court’s decision binds it or, alternatively, that the
underlying facts can be distinguished. Of course, to scholars who
posit that the distinction between law and fact is itself a legal
fiction, 294 this uncertainty is hardly news. Nevertheless, the Court’s
treatment of law and fact in these cases further exacerbates
these difficulties.
1. Shelby County
Shelby County’s dismissal of congressional facts raises puzzling
doctrinal questions. The Court’s analysis conveniently skipped an
important step. The Chief Justice contended that because the VRA
places a great burden on the principle of equal state sovereignty and
because voter discrimination is a smaller problem than it once was,
the VRA’s constitutional burden is too high for the statute to stand.
The Court, however, never considered facts that would shine light
on whether the problem of voter discrimination today might warrant
the VRA’s burden on state sovereignty, notwithstanding
improvements over the past half century. Instead, the Court assumed
292. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and
Perils of Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1995 (2006) (“Few major
constitutional debates are clear-cut propositions . . . .”).
293. See Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 62 (2013);
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233 (1985)
(explaining that law and fact “are points of rest and relative stability on a continuum
of experience”).
294. See Larsen, supra note 293, at 67–68 (discussing this scholarship). See generally
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1769, 1770 (2003); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992).
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that because “[t]hings have changed in the South,” 295 the coverage
formula’s disparate treatment of states was invalid.
The Court’s leap to this conclusion left open serious questions
about how future courts should evaluate legislation seeking to
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. The Court, in particular,
offered little guidance about what kinds of contemporary evidence
might support similar remedial legislation. Indeed, the Court did not
even articulate the legal test for reviewing the constitutionality of
legislation protecting against voter discrimination.
As a result, it is very difficult for future courts to know how to
treat similar legislation with a different record. Would a new
coverage formula deserve greater judicial respect? If so, why did the
Court ignore evidence that preclearance continued to do important
work? Does the principle of equal state sovereignty essentially ban all
future attempts to protect against voter discrimination on the theory
that only the Jim Crow South’s egregious discrimination justified
such intrusions on federalism? Alternatively, would evidence
suggesting that racial discrimination in voting had reduced minority
turnout or diluted minority voting power in recent elections
diminish the decision’s precedential value? And how should lower
courts approach other statutes enforcing the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments? 296
The Court offers little guidance for considering such issues. Even
when it asserted that states ought to be treated equally, the Court
acknowledged that it would permit “‘departure from the
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty [if there were] a showing
that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to
the problem that it targets.’” 297 From this perspective, one should
think that different facts could justify a different outcome. 298 That
said, a similarly constituted Supreme Court would likely view a new
coverage formula skeptically. In all events, these questions about how

295. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013) (alteration in original)
(quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009)).
296. Cf. Larsen, Shelf Life, supra note 275, at 60–61.
297. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203).
298. Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 271–72 (1999).
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to treat facts inevitably create further questions about the content of
the law.
2. Citizens United
Citizens United’s conclusion that only quid pro quo corruption
justifies restrictions on corporate independent expenditures for
election-related speech seems plain enough. Even a more robust
record of corruption (more broadly understood) cannot support the
constitutionality of a law regulating independent expenditures by
corporations’ general treasuries for election-related speech. 299 To this
extent, the law of campaign finance reform is straightforward,
albeit controversial.
Citizens United’s broader First Amendment implications,
however, remain unclear. As the Court itself explained, restrictions
on speech, especially political speech, typically trigger strict
scrutiny. 300 Under strict scrutiny, the government must establish that
its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
This is a hard test to meet, but it is not impossible. 301 In a typical
case, the government presents facts to try to establish the necessity of
its policy. Courts must determine whether those facts justify
upholding the law under the strict scrutiny standard. Oftentimes, the
policy falls because a court determines that the government has not
met its burden. 302 Sometimes, though, as in Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, the Court finds that the policy satisfies strict scrutiny. 303

299. See Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam)
(invalidating Montana campaign finance law despite robust findings about history of
corruption in Montana ostensibly justifying law).
300. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Laws that burden political
speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the
restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.’”(quoting FED v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007))).
301. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010).
302. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 855 (2006) (noting that speech
restrictions survive strict scrutiny in 22% of total cases in federal courts).
303. See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39. Admittedly, the Court upheld the
law using “a light touch in examining the government’s justifications.” Aziz Z. Huq,
Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16,
23 (2012).

584

1.BERGER.FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

525

1/10/2018 2:20 PM

When Facts Don’t Matter

Citizens United appeared to prejudge the issue without applying
strict scrutiny at all. 304 The Court, in other words, was uninterested
in the amount of harm inflicted on our country by corporate rentseeking, 305 notwithstanding the argument that some “threats of
corruption are far more destructive to a democratic society than the
odd bribe.” 306 The Court did not so much respond to this argument
as offer the unsupported rejoinder that independent expenditures
“do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”307
It similarly did not seem to care whether such harm could be
prevented by other less speech-restrictive measures. Rather, the
majority insisted that, as a matter of law, such evidence did not
matter, 308 because the record did not contain “direct examples of
votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures.” 309
Had the Court actually applied the strict scrutiny standard to the
facts, it might have still struck down the law. It could have
concluded, for instance, that the governmental interest did not have
a compelling interest in preventing the corruption Congress had
identified. 310 Alternatively, and probably more likely, it could have

304. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 581, 617 (2011) (arguing that by keeping the “evidentiary standard impossibly high and
the definition of corruption extremely narrow,” the Court avoided confronting the difficult
question of whether expenditure limits might in fact pass strict scrutiny).
305. See 146 CONG. REC. 6950 (2000) (discussing political corruption); Teachout,
supra note 87, at 297 (noting that Citizens United “suffers from a failure to describe real
pressures [on politicians and their staffers], and the way those pressures directly interfere with
representative government in devastating ways”).
306. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 449 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
307. Id. at 357 (majority opinion).
308. See id. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to
quid pro quo corruption.”).
309. Id. at 360 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 560 (D.D.C. 2003)).
310. Such a conclusion would have been in tension with some important First
Amendment precedent. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205–06 & n.88 (2003)
(sustaining “legislation aimed at the ‘corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations
of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas’” with the purposing of
“[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and sustain[ing] the
active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of the
government” (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)));
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 (1978)); id. at 788 n.26 (“Congress
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concluded that the policy was not sufficiently tailored for various
reasons, including the ease with which campaign finance regulations
are circumvented. 311 But though it gestured toward these
conclusions, 312 the Court did not engage seriously with the facts
underlying the strict scrutiny analysis. 313
The Court’s approach leaves open important questions for First
Amendment doctrine. Are courts to conclude in future campaign
finance cases—or even other free speech cases—that some
restrictions do not trigger strict scrutiny but rather are categorically
invalid? The Court’s approach implies a categorical approach that
calls into serious question the constitutionality of congressional and
state attempts to limit independent expenditures (absent findings of
quid pro quo corruption). 314 However, the Court still purports to
apply strict scrutiny, which at least ostensibly invites some inquiry
into the governmental interest. 315 The result is doctrinal confusion.
3. NFIB
Similarly, NFIB’s Commerce Clause discussion also makes it
difficult to disentangle legal determinations from factual ones. Five
Justices put significant weight on the distinction between activity and
inactivity. 316 Might future Courts invalidate long-accepted exercises
of congressional power on the theory that the regulated activity
could be characterized as inactivity? For example, as Professor
might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in
independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.”).
311. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign
Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2011) (“[I]n a system like ours—where elections
are privately funded, where reform is piecemeal, and where public finance is generally not a
realistic option—money hasn’t been taken out of politics. Donors simply find new, less
transparent ways to gain influence in the process.”); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 161,
at 1708.
312. See Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 364.
313. Cf. id. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our
lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take
measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in
local and national races.”).
314. See Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United: Campaign Finance,
Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 903, 910 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken,
Real Problem].
315. See Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 340.
316. See supra Section I.A.3.
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Metzger asks, could the Court strike down a federal statute requiring
that new cars have seatbelts that can secure a child’s car seat, on the
theory that some purchasers would not use that feature and are,
therefore, inactive? 317 Assuming arguendo that the Chief Justice’s
and joint dissenters’ Commerce Clause analyses are not solely dicta,
this question is hard to answer without knowing whether those
Justices’ characterization of the health care market was an
idiosyncratic view of the facts in one case or a legal instruction to
characterize policy issues so as to limit Congress’s power.
More generally, it is unclear whether NFIB represents a serious
limitation on Congress’s commerce authority, or whether it is an
isolated decision that applies only to a very unusual statutory feature.
The Chief Justice did admit that “it is now well established that
Congress has broad authority under the [Commerce] Clause.” 318 His
interpretation in NFIB, though, seemed awfully stingy, denying
Congress power to regulate the health care market, despite that
market’s manifest impact on interstate commerce. It is unclear
whether this analysis applies only to Congress’s anomalous decision
to require the purchase of a product or, alternatively, whether it
signals that the Court will approach future Commerce Clause cases
with an eye toward limiting federal power.
4. More general doctrinal implications
The Court’s approaches in these cases also raise difficult
questions about some foundations of our adversarial system. Basic
rules of American litigation ensure that courts decide concrete cases
so that they have the benefit of a full record of facts. Standing rules,
for instance, require that litigants have an actual stake in the case.319
Ripeness rules, similarly, seek to separate matters that are premature
for review from those with injuries appropriate for federal court
review. 320 Though both doctrines advance multiple goals, they share
the presumption that courts, including appellate courts, should

317.
318.
319.
320.

See Metzger, supra note 133, at 95.
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012).
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 124 (7th ed. 2016).
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decide cases with more than “factually barebones records.” 321 While
these decisions do not directly call these doctrines into question,
they do raise doubts about the preference for developed facts
underlying some justiciability doctrines. Why prioritize developed
facts when the Court sometimes just casts them aside?
Relatedly, the Court on numerous occasions has signaled that
facial adjudication is premature if sufficient facts are not available.322
The Court’s approaches in these cases, however, suggest that it often
doesn’t care about facts at all. For example, once the Court decided
to treat Citizens United as a facial challenge, it could have remanded
the case for findings about how BCRA operated in practice. 323 The
Court instead rushed to judgment, apparently uninterested in the
law’s effects. Similarly, the Court in Shelby County appeared mostly
uninterested in evidence of continued discrimination and
preclearance’s role in preventing voter discrimination. The result is
confusion about the criteria for determining whether a facial or asapplied challenge is more appropriate. 324 Admittedly, that confusion
exists anyway, 325 but the Court’s approach in these cases only
deepens it.
In fairness, it is virtually impossible for the Court to balance all
the competing norms in play in constitutional litigation. Our
Constitution is full of conflicting values, 326 which makes doctrinal
tensions nearly inevitable. Nevertheless, the Court’s disregard of
facts in these cases heightens those tensions.

321. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (quoting United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)).
322. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200 (2008);
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 89 (1947); Fallon, supra note 135, at 960–61.
323. See supra Section I.B.2.
324. See generally Fallon, supra note 135, at 917–20 (discussing the “general myopia
and confusion with respect to facial challenges in the Supreme Court, perhaps most especially,
but by no means exclusively, among the Justices themselves”).
325. See id. at 917.
326. See, e.g., Justice David H. Souter, Commencement Address at Harvard University
(May 27, 2010), in HARV. GAZETTE, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05
/text-of-justice-david-souters-speech/ (“Not even [the Constitution’s] most uncompromising
and unconditional language can resolve every potential tension of one provision with
another . . . .”).
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B. Institutional Implications
1. Congressional irrelevance
The Court’s willingness to disregard congressional facts when
striking down federal legislation makes it harder for Congress to
address pressing national problems. To be sure, the Court plays only
a small role in the larger problem of congressional paralysis. Extreme
partisan strife and the usual vetogates that make legislation hard to
pass even in saner times have made it increasingly difficult for
Congress to enact statutes. 327 But the Court exacerbates the problem
when it develops creative theories to invalidate legislation, knowing
full well that Congress is very unlikely to pass a revised version.
For example, when the Court struck down the coverage formula
in Shelby County, it knew that Congress would not have the
wherewithal to enact a new one. The Court indicated that it was
merely leaving the matter in Congress’s hands, 328 but it knew that
current political realities and the structural difficulties of passing
legislation made it impossible for Congress to enact a new coverage
formula in the foreseeable future. The effect, then, was the
invalidation of the preclearance provision, notwithstanding the
Court’s claims to be addressing only the coverage formula. 329
Similarly, after Citizens United the combination of politics and
judicial doctrine made it highly unlikely that Congress could reenact
meaningful campaign finance reform. Indeed, as Professor Gerken
has pointed out, Citizens United’s most enduring legacy is that it
substantially cut back on Congress’s power to regulate in the area of
campaign finance. 330 In this way, the Court’s approach limited
Congress’s ability to deal with the nation’s ills.
327. See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE
THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 3–106 (2012) (describing partisan strife and political dysfunction);
William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 756,
756 (2015) (discussing vetogates).
328. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (“Congress may draft
another formula based on current conditions.”).
329. See id. (“We issue no holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage formula.”).
330. See Gerken, Real Problem, supra note 314, at 908–11 (noting that Citizens United
“prevented Congress and the FEC from adopting sensible fixes going forward”); see also
Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 89–100
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2. Separation-of-powers concerns
The Court’s aggressive rejection of congressional facts also raises
related questions about the judiciary’s role in our system of
separation of powers. When the Court brushes aside congressional
facts, it can more easily rely on its own views of the world. Whereas
the Court clearly enjoys the prerogative to say what the law is, 331 it is
far more controversial for the Court to assert that its instincts about
the health care market, corruption in the political process, or racial
discrimination in voting should supersede the other branches’ views
on such topics.
While the Court in these cases did not purport to enjoy superior
expertise to Congress on these topics, it did decide the constitutional
questions without careful evaluation of evidence documenting
continued voter discrimination, rent-seeking in politics, or the free
rider problem in our health care system. 332 Each of these policy areas
looks very different when the core problem is brushed aside, and the
propriety of legislative action also looks different when Congress
seems to be acting without a real problem to address. We are more
likely to think Congress has overstepped its bounds when it does not
appear to be trying to remedy serious societal mischief but rather is
intruding on the liberty of people or institutions who are
“doing nothing.” 333
It is not clear that judicial review should encompass the authority
to ignore or recharacterize the mischief Congress tries to remedy.
After all, the federal judiciary does not possess either the expertise or
the constitutional authority to determine which problems require
legislative attention. 334 Moreover, the people elect members of
(2013) (discussing the emergence of single-candidate Super PACs and the extraordinary
amounts of coordination the law permits between Super PAC and political campaign).
331. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
332. Cf. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 19
(2016) (noting that the Court has arrogated to itself the power to second guess congressional
policy decisions).
333. Cf. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
334. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Pro-Constitutional Representation: Comparing the Role
Obligations of Judges and Elected Representatives in Constitutional Democracy, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1717, 1737–38 (2016) (comparing the role of elected representatives with that
of appointed judges).
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Congress to represent their normative views and address the nation’s
problems. 335 Judicial restraint, indeed, is premised significantly on the
understanding that politically accountable representatives, rather
than unelected judges, should guide policy decisions and the values
inspiring them. 336
Of course, courts’ institutional limitations should not give license
to Congress to falsify empirical facts or violate clear constitutional
strictures. But the Constitutional “rules” Congress supposedly
violated in these cases were hardly clear. To the contrary, the Court
devised them in the instant cases. 337 Even more to the point, in each
case the Court was able to find the statutes constitutionally infirm
only by brushing aside the very evidence that Congress thought
justified the statute.
For all its talk of judicial restraint, 338 the Court often trusts its
own view of the world more than anyone else’s. By deeming
irrelevant facts that Congress found and that lawyers subsequently
presented, 339 the Court can more easily steer a case to its desired
outcome. Indeed, in each of the cases examined here, it would have
been harder for the Justices to reach their ultimate conclusion had
they forced themselves to grapple honestly and thoroughly with facts
they evaded.
The judicial behavior examined here is part of a larger pattern of
judicial aggrandizement. The Court, indeed, is increasingly inserting
itself into political, policy, and cultural disputes, sometimes

335. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L.
REV. 519, 521 (2012) (stating that one meaning sometimes given to judicial self-restraint is
constitutional restraint where respect for the elected branch comes from the notion that the
elected branch handles policy better).
336. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 139–40 (2d ed.1986);
Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1082–83 (2008).
337. See supra notes 201–227 and accompanying text.
338. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610–11 (1973) (“[U]nder our
constitutional system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the
validity of the Nation’s laws.”).
339. See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Respondent at 13–34, Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570
U.S. 2 (2013) (No. 12–96), 2013 WL 315242 (citing congressional findings supporting the
decision to reenact section 5 and that the statute’s burdens were justified by then current
needs and were appropriately tailored geographically); Brief for Petitioners at 3–12, Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs. v. Florida, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (sub. nom. NFIB v. Sebelius) (No. 11398), 2012 WL 37168 (summarizing facts upon which Congress relied when it enacted ACA).
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deemphasizing justiciability doctrines and other reasons to avoid
ruling on the merits. As Professor Monaghan has pointed out, the
Supreme Court in recent years appears to have shifted its
institutional mission from dispute resolution to law declaration.340
The Court has long vacillated between these different models, but
recently it seems especially willing to reach out to decide
controversial questions that it could avoid. 341 The Court’s treatment
of congressional facts, then, is part of a larger phenomenon in which
the Court has moved more aggressively to shape its own agenda and
announce the country’s core constitutional commitments.
In short, the Court’s approach to facts raises serious separationof-powers concerns. 342 This Court’s apparent distrust of the
legislative branch is a remarkable, if unstated, assertion of judicial
supremacy. Though the Court talks a good game about the virtues
of deference to elected leaders, 343 its approach to factual findings is
symptomatic of a Court that believes it knows best. 344 Given that
constitutional law at its essence asks courts to determine “who
decides,” 345 it is noteworthy that the Court retains for itself the
power to decide not only the content of the law but also
fundamental facts about the world in which we all live.
3. Judicial confidence and public opinion
The Court’s treatment of Congress’s facts reflects Justices who
are very confident in their own views. 346 This confidence is perhaps
surprising. Congress may or may not have struck the correct policy
balance in these statutes, but it at least studied the issues and made
determinations about the underlying problems. 347 The Court, to be
340. See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668 (2012).
341. See id. at 669.
342. See Karlan, supra note 81, at 64 (“Across a broad range of cases, the Court
expressed a suspicion of the political process . . . .”).
343. See Berger, Deference Determinations, supra note 17, at 469.
344. See SEGALL, supra note 228, at 126–27.
345. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS 162 (2001).
346. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Foreword: The Confident Court, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
379, 384 (2014).
347. See, e.g., Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting
Rights Act: How Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L.

592

1.BERGER.FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

525

1/10/2018 2:20 PM

When Facts Don’t Matter

sure, has superior expertise on questions of constitutional law, but
this expertise does not obviously extend to judgments about the
problems Congress seeks to remedy. Nevertheless, the Justices based
their constitutional analyses in large part on a worldview uninformed
by Congress’s expertise.
Moreover, notwithstanding the Court’s confident rejection of
congressional findings, the Justices themselves were deeply divided
about the relevance of the underlying facts. 348 Indeed, the
congressional findings that five Justices found irrelevant in Shelby
County, Citizens United, and NFIB were central to the other four
Justices’ reasoning in each case. These deep divisions belie
the majority’s conviction that Congress’s facts should be
casually discarded. 349
The majority Justices in these cases may have been convinced
they were correct, but their approaches may also compromise the
Court’s legitimacy. When the Court brushes aside important facts in
the name of newfound doctrine, it heightens the chance that the
public will understand its opinions to be political documents. 350 This
risk is likely highest when a significant portion of the country takes
seriously the same facts the Court ignored. For example, the public
reacted strongly against Citizens United, in part because many
people did think corruption of the sort Congress identified was a
serious problem. 351 Some readers may also have been skeptical of

REV. 385, 403 (2008) (“[T]he amount of evidence amassed by Congress also stands as
evidence of the particularly deliberative approach during the 2006 reauthorization process.
Congress considered more evidence and committed more resources to studying the problem
of ongoing voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions than it had to any other issue in
several years.”); Renata E. Strause & Daniel P. Tokaji, Between Access and Influence: Building a
Record for the Next Court, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 179, 213 (2014) (noting that
when Congress considered BCRA, it reviewed, inter alia, committee testimony, multiple
investigations by Congressional committees, large-scale studies by advocacy and academic
organizations, and lengthy statements by members of Congress).
348. See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 694–97; Gorod, supra note 10, at 53.
349. Cf. Gorod, supra note 10, at 56 (arguing that judicial opinions rarely try to gather
all relevant facts and instead depend on “guesswork, intuition, and general impressions”).
350. See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 733–35.
351. See Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010
SUP. CT. REV. 103, 111–12 (noting that 80% of Americans reportedly opposed Citizens United
and 65% strongly opposed it); Sarah Knight, Five Years After Citizens United, Signs of a
Backlash, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/five-years-aftercitizens-united-signs-backlash-303336 (discussing the fallout after Citizens United).
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the Court’s unsupported assertion that “[t]he appearance of
influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in
our democracy.” 352
Some commentators today contend that the Supreme Court’s
legitimacy is in serious trouble. 353 According to recent polls, the
Supreme Court’s approval rating in 2016 fell to 42% and has been
below 50% since Citizens United. 354 Some studies report that 82% of
Americans believe that the Justices decide cases in part based on their
personal views. 355 To be sure, the Court has always been the subject
of criticism, but some argue that “the institution and its members are
being disparaged by a wider and more sophisticated audience than
ever before.” 356 Indeed, the Court’s ostensible impartiality is
especially vulnerable to attack when the Justices ignore important
facts or rely on contestable ones. 357
Of course, to the extent public approval for the Court has fallen,
the Court’s approach to facts is only a part of that phenomenon. The
country is sharply divided along partisan lines, 358 and many
Americans cheer or jeer judicial decisions because of their outcomes,

352. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).
353. See Brian Christopher Jones, Disparaging the Supreme Court: Is SCOTUS in Serious
Trouble?, 2015 WISC. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 63 (“[T]he Court has unquestionably brought this
increased disparagement upon itself.”).
354. See Supreme Court, GALLUP NEWS, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732
/supreme-court.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2017); Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Supreme Court Job
Approval Rating Ties Record Low, GALLUP NEWS (July 29, 2016), http://www.gallup.com
/poll/194057/supreme-court-job-approval-rating-ties-record-low.aspx.
355. See Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law Is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in WHAT’S
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 306, 308 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011); B. Jessie Hill,
Resistance to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme Court, Constitutional Change, and the
“Pragmatic Moment”, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1815, 1816 (2013).
356. See Jones, supra note 353, at 53. But see Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New
Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153, 154 (2013) (arguing that public opinion
polls have given the Justices more legitimacy).
357. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social
Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961–63, 1984–88 (2006)
(criticizing courts’ reliance on facts in cases involving controversial social change); Kahan,
supra note 252, at 34 (noting that when the Court has invoked empirical evidence in deeply
contested constitutional cases “the genuineness of its reasoning has provoked accusations of
bad faith, not only from within the Court but also from without”).
358. See generally MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 327; Toni M. Massaro & Robin
Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, and Emerging Evidence on Civility and Effective
Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 422–27 (2012).
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without reference to their reasoning. 359 That said, when the Court
turns a blind eye to seemingly crucial facts, it risks magnifying the
losing side’s outrage. 360 This reaction, in turn, might heighten the
public’s sense that the Court is a political institution.
This concern should not be overstated. In an era when some
public officials, including the President of the United States, ignore
facts entirely, 361 the Court, by contrast, seems like a temple of
enlightenment rationality. Yet when the Court is so quick to brush
aside important legislative findings without seriously engaging with
the evidence or arguments in favor of their relevance, it risks opening
itself up to avoidable comparisons with obviously mendacious
public actors. 362
C. The Demise of Facts
Finally, the Court’s attitude in these cases also contributes to the
broader decline of facts in our society. Politicians and some segments
of the media frequently reject facts they deem inconvenient to their
political ends. There has always been good-faith disagreement about
which facts are empirically correct and which ones should matter, but
in recent years, there has been an alarming tendency to label as
“fake” any stories that might harm one’s political agenda. 363
In most regards, the judiciary has done a better job than the
other branches of government at examining asserted facts critically
and subjecting them to rigorous assessment. Courts, after all, have

359.
360.

See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 729–30.
See EMILY M. CALHOUN, LOSING TWICE: HARMS OF INDIFFERENCE IN THE
SUPREME COURT 8 (2011).
361. See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos, Trump Won’t Back Down from His Voting Fraud Lie.
Here Are the Facts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24
/us/politics/unauthorized-immigrant-voting-trump-lie.html; Donald Lambro, Trump and the
Facts, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/26
/donald-trump-and-the-facts/ (noting that President Trump’s administration “has redefined
the word ‘facts’”).
362. Cf. CALHOUN, supra note 360, at 108.
363. See Jeremy W. Peters, Wielding Claims of ‘Fake News,’ Conservatives Take Aim at
Mainstream Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/25
/us/politics/fake-news-claims-conservatives-mainstream-media-.html; Amber Phillips, ‘Fake
News’? The Russia Investigation is Getting Very, Very Real, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2017), https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/08/07/fake-news-the-russia-investiga
tion-is-getting-very-very-real/?utm_term=.56952464eab1.
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rules governing their consideration of evidence and facts found by
other institutions. 364 For all its flaws, the judiciary, including the
Supreme Court, is functioning far better these days than the other
branches of government.
That said, the Court’s approach to facts in these—and other 365—
cases contributes, albeit modestly, to the broader problem. The
Court’s willingness to brush aside facts that Congress, the dissenters,
and many others thought crucial to understanding the challenged
legislation is a small part of a broader societal instinct to turn a blind
eye to facts that do not conform to one’s pre-determined world
view. 366 If Supreme Court Justices are so willing to say that seemingly
crucial facts do not matter, they may inadvertently signal that it is
rhetorically acceptable to disregard inconvenient evidence. The
Court’s example may be especially important for law students, who
learn about the conventions of legal argumentation in part from
reading Supreme Court opinions.
Also significantly, the Court rejected these facts’ relevance in the
name of controversial ideological principles. To be sure, the Justices
were correct that the judiciary ultimately must decide when statutes
violate the Constitution. But the majorities brushed aside Congress’s
facts in service of a deeply contested constitutional vision. 367 To this
extent, the majorities’ treatment of facts is symptomatic of a broader
societal phenomenon in which ideology trumps facts.
The Court’s apparent prioritization of constitutional ideology
over factual detail means that the Justices sometimes decide
constitutional questions in an intellectual vacuum. By brushing aside
the policy implications of the statutes at issue, the majority Justices
rendered each of these decisions more intellectually abstract. This is
no coincidence. It is easier to conclude that a statute violates the
Constitution if one focuses on the constitutional norms at issue and
shortchanges the policy goals the statute seeks to further.
Indeed, it is far from clear that the majorities’ ideological
preferences could have prevailed had the Justices considered the facts
364.
365.
note 17.
366.
367.
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See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.; 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015); Berger, Gross Error, supra
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 252; supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.A.
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it ignored. 368 The Court disregarded the real-world effects of the
statutes at issue, because consideration of those facts would have
militated against the conclusions the Court wished to reach. To be
sure, there were strong legal arguments in favor of the majorities’
outcomes in these cases. However, the majority opinions in each case
were less persuasive because the Court failed to engage carefully with
facts from the world around it.
IV. POTENTIAL REFORMS
The Court’s penchant for evading inconvenient facts may be
problematic, but the question remains what to do about it. To the
extent some Justices sometimes ignore congressional findings and
exploit the muddy distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges to advance their own normative commitments, an
academic rebuke alone will not solve the problem. A solution is all
the more difficult to devise because the Justices’ approach to facts
sometimes may be quite unconscious, as the Justices, like most
people, instinctively gravitate toward evidence supporting their
preferred conclusion and away from contrary evidence. 369 To borrow
an insight from Professors Posner and Vermeule, given that the
problem explored here is a creation of the Justices, it is unrealistic to
expect that they would voluntarily mend their ways. 370
That said, attention is the first step in encouraging changes to
the legal culture underlying the problem. While no law review article
will immediately prompt changed judicial behavior, a careful
discussion of the ways in which the Justices could write better
opinions can gradually help change legal norms. Lawyers litigating
before the Court, for instance, can emphasize not only important
facts but also the reasons why the Justices should not ignore those
facts. Relatedly, law professors can encourage their students—
tomorrow’s lawyers and judges—to think about what sound judicial
opinions should include. To that end, this Part discusses modest
368. See supra notes 338–40 and accompanying text.
369. See FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM 23 (Joseph Devey ed., 1902) (1620)
(“The human understanding, when any proposition has been once laid down . . . forces
everything else to add fresh support and confirmation.”); supra Section II.C.
370. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1743, 1744–45 (2013).
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changes that could improve the Court’s opinion writing and its
treatment of facts.
A. The Content of the Court’s Determinations
1. The legal relevance of facts
When the Court considers the constitutionality of a federal
statute, it should more carefully explain why it finds Congress’s facts
relevant or not. Similarly, when the Court must choose between
treating a constitutional challenge as facial or as-applied, the Court
should not only carefully justify its selected approach but also explain
the impact that approach has on the universe of relevant facts. These
suggestions are so commonsensical as to be obvious, but the Court
in the cases examined here did none of these things.
The suggestions here do not infringe on the Court’s discretion
to invalidate statutes it deems unconstitutional, but they do
encourage the Court to acknowledge more fully the facts it sets
aside. In particular, the Justices should admit when they are
disposing of congressional evidence primarily on the basis of new or
long-dormant constitutional doctrine. The Court, of course, enjoys
the prerogative to craft new constitutional rules, and sometimes new
doctrine is entirely appropriate. 371 But when the Court casts aside
reams of evidence in service of new doctrine, it should admit what
it is doing.
Indeed, the Court’s doctrinal bait-and-switch disrespects
Congress, which gathered facts to support a statute under certain
constitutional ground rules only to have the Court change course.
This practice grants tremendous discretion to judges to invent
doctrinal wrinkles that permit them to ignore the very problem
Congress sought to address. If the Court can simultaneously
announce new doctrinal tests and dismiss congressional facts for
failing those new tests, it has virtually limitless power to rewrite both
law and fact.

371. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955).
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The Justices themselves likely would not admit such authority. 372
Perhaps for that reason, the Court has been far from transparent
when it brushes aside congressional facts. The Justices in these cases
were quick to cordon off Congress’s findings as irrelevant, but they
offered little admission that they were doing this and minimal
explanation for why those findings didn’t matter.
Similarly, the Justices failed to provide thorough explanations for
its decision to treat these cases as facial challenges, especially given
persuasive arguments that each case (especially Shelby County and
Citizens United) should have been decided as-applied. Nor did the
Court explain how those determinations affected the relevance of
particular facts. For example, the history of voter discrimination in
Alabama and Shelby County would have been central to the analysis
had the Court treated the case as an as-applied challenge—and
likely would have cut against the Court’s holding. 373 The Court
should not make such important determinations without more
careful discussion.
Nor should the Court brush aside facts as legally irrelevant
without offering some explanation of what kinds of facts would
suffice. Shelby County leaves us to understand that evidence of
second-generation barriers to voting is insufficient to justify the
Voting Right Act’s preclearance coverage formula. Nowhere,
however, does the Court clearly state what evidence Congress should
offer instead.
To the contrary, the Court substituted pithiness for sustained
analysis. Confronted with the argument that section 5’s deterrent
effects should justify the coverage formula, the Court complained
that this approach would leave the law “effectively immune from
scrutiny.” 374 “[N]o matter how ‘clean’ the record of covered

372. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner Broad. II), 520 U.S. 180, 195
(1997) (“We owe Congress’ findings deference in part because the institution ‘is far better
equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon’
legislative questions.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC (Turner Broad. I), 512 U.S. 622, 665–66 (1994) (plurality opinion))); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (noting that legislative findings aid “informed
judicial review, as do the reports of the legislative committees, by revealing the rationale of the
legislation”); Berger, Deference Determinations, supra note 17, at 472.
373. See supra Section I.B.1.
374. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627 (2013).
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jurisdictions,” the Court worried, “the argument could always be
made that it was deterrence that accounted for the good
behavior.” 375 The Court’s attempted legal jujitsu may be clever, but it
fails to grapple with facts before Congress indicating that many
covered jurisdictions’ records would not have been “clean” but for
section 5.
Rather than looking for a reason to ignore Congress’s findings, a
better approach would confront the strongest arguments that
Congress’s facts do in fact justify the law at issue. In some cases, the
Court might still conclude that the statute is unconstitutional. In all
cases, though, the Justices at least would have seriously engaged with
the evidence and arguments Congress considered most important.
2. The characterization of facts
The characterization of facts is closely related to their relevance.
Once again, the Court owes a more careful explanation of its
determinations. NFIB’s Commerce Clause analysis, in particular,
turned substantially on how the Court perceived the object of
Congress’s regulation. As we have seen, whereas the Chief Justice
and joint dissenters characterized the statute as regulating “inaction”
(i.e., people forced to buy something they otherwise wouldn’t),
Justice Ginsburg treated the same behavior as “action” (i.e., the
decision to pass one’s health care costs onto the rest of society).
These characterizations mattered a great deal, but because the
Chief Justice simply asserted his preferred characterization, he never
clarified the nature of his constitutional objection. Did the Chief
Justice believe that it was unconstitutional to require an unwilling
person to buy health insurance, even with evidence demonstrating
that that same uninsured person will go to the doctor tomorrow and
not pay his bill? Alternatively, did he believe that the existence of
uninsured non-free riders renders the entire mandate facially
unconstitutional, even as applied to free riders? A defense of the
preferred characterization would have shed much needed light on
these questions.

375.
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Thus, just as the Court could better explain the relevance or
irrelevance of particular facts, so too could it better justify its choice
of one characterization over another. After all, the Chief Justice in
this case selected a characterization that allowed him to ignore
findings linking the free rider problem to interstate commerce. In
fact, the Court sometimes does not even acknowledge that its
version of the “facts” is, really, a preference for one characterization
over another.
To be sure, Justices will always be able to steer an opinion where
they want it to go. That said, if Justices were in the habit of engaging
thoroughly with inconvenient facts, they may be a little more selfaware of the extent to which their own characterizations are value
laden. While it may be impossible to remove Justices’ norms from
these kinds of determinations, 376 the Justices could do a better job
recognizing their underlying values by acknowledging their
characterizations in the first place.
3. The context of institutional analysis
The Court could also explain more carefully its reasons for
trusting or distrusting Congress in each case. Of course, the veracity
and relevance of facts are analytically distinct, and the Court
sometimes dismisses Congress’s facts as legally extraneous without
indicating that it disbelieves them. That said, the Court may be more
inclined to discard certain facts if it distrusts the methods Congress
used to gather the facts. After all, if a Justice does distrust
congressional facts, it may be easier for judges to brush inconvenient
facts aside as a matter of law than to try to demonstrate they are
empirically incorrect.
However, the Court ultimately treats congressional facts, it could
offer more careful institutional analysis. While the Court
theoretically could decide to grant or deny deference in all cases
involving congressional facts, 377 there are serious dangers of a one-

376. See, e.g., SEGALL, supra note 228, at 59–60; William N. Eskridge & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 351–
52 (1990).
377. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative FactFinding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 46–55 (2009) (arguing that blind deference is not appropriate and
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size-fits-all approach. Institutional behavior and factual contexts can
differ tremendously from case to case, and a theory of deference that
might make sense in one case might be less desirable or even absurd
if mechanically applied elsewhere. 378
Indeed, depending on the context, Congress may or may not be
deserving of deference. 379 On the one hand, Congress, unlike courts,
enjoys the resources to gather information from numerous sources.
It can hold hearings and call witnesses to bolster its factual
understanding of important questions. 380 When Congress makes
decisions based on its careful use of these institutional advantages,
there are good reasons to think that its facts deserve deference.
Congress, however, sometimes makes decisions based on
ideological preferences rather than empirical realities. 381 It sometimes
acts at the behest of special interest groups, and, when it does,
committees sometimes send staffers to assemble boilerplate factual
findings without doing real research. 382 Congressional committees
likewise can select witnesses to justify pet projects rather than to
gather a complete, unbiased account of the facts. 383 Whether
Congress’s facts are to be trusted in a particular case, then,
depends not on abstractions about its inherent institutional

suggesting a theory to apply instead); cf. Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Pluralism and
Constitutional Interpretations, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014).
378. See Araiza, supra note 13, at 906–30 (proposing inquiries to guide the deference
determination); Berger, Deference Determinations, supra note 17, at 498–500.
379. See Devins, supra note 13, at 1207.
380. See, e.g., Charlow, supra note 279, at 578–79; Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress
in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 209–11 (1971); Daniel A. Farber
& Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 448 (1988).
381. See Borgmann, supra note 377, at 8; Devins, supra note 13, at 1183; William H.
Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political
Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 398–401 (1988).
382. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 13, at 1208; Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. the Cloister:
Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under the PostCivil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337, 367–68 (1984).
383. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1017
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (concluding that congressional findings had been driven by policy goals
rather than medical or scientific evidence); KOMESAR, supra note 345, at 141; Devins, supra
note 13, at 1197 (“Congress finds facts when there is a reason to do so.”).
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properties but whether the legislature made serious use of its factfinding capacities. 384
The Court, however, often does not explain why it trusts or
distrusts Congress’s facts and their relevance in a given case. Of
course, sometimes it may be difficult to glean Congress’s fact-finding
processes from the available materials, but the Court often does not
even bother to look. 385 It also often does not even discuss how
Congress made use of the facts it found or whether Congress
included those facts in the statute itself.
To be sure, the Court sometimes gestures toward Congress’s
epistemological strengths or weaknesses, but broad platitudes about
Congress’s broad institutional characteristics are not a substitute for
careful, contextual institutional analysis. 386 Rather than relying on
generalizations about Congress’s institutional strengths, the Court
should engage in careful institutional analysis discussing whether
Congress’s factual findings are likely to be trustworthy given the
particular context. Similarly, it should compare Congress’s relevant
institutional characteristics with its own. 387
The Court in some cases may suspect Congress of biased fact
finding, but because the Justices do not engage carefully in these
analyses, it is sometimes difficult to know what they are thinking. In
Shelby County, for instance, the Court did not make clear if it
distrusted evidence indicating that preclearance continued to do
important work in many covered jurisdictions. Were Congress’s
factual findings less rigorous than usual? Did the record suggest that
Congress had already determined the “facts” it wanted before it
began gathering evidence? Did the Court want more evidence that
preclearance continued to protect against voter discrimination or
that the coverage formula could not have been effectively redrawn?
The Court never said.

384. See Araiza, supra note 13, at 906–22 (proposing inquiries to guide the deference
determination); Devins, supra note 13, at 1170.
385. Perhaps some Justices do look but do not include their findings in their
written opinions.
386. See Berger, Deference Determinations, supra note 17, at 501–05.
387. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 197 (1994) (arguing that
institutional analysis must necessarily be comparative).
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The Court should also examine whether facts enacted into the
statute itself deserve special weight. While there are reasons to think
courts should care about Congress’s sense of the problem in all
events, one would think that textualists in particular would want to
engage with factual findings enacted into a statute, like the ACA.
The Justices in NFIB, however, offered no such discussion.
The Court should also discuss whether Congress enjoys
particular epistemic authority over the subject matter at issue.
Congress presumably will know more than courts about most
matters of policy, but arguably it is especially knowledgeable about
certain topics. For example, in the areas of voting rights and
campaign finance reform, Congress dealt with topics about which
senators and representatives have greater experience than most
judges. 388 The Court, however, did not even discuss whether
Congress’s findings over such topics merited special respect
or attention.
The point here is not that the Court should necessarily view the
political branches’ factual findings charitably. 389 Indeed, where facts
truly are legally irrelevant, Congress’s processes and expertise should
not matter. However, the Court sometimes blurs together the legal
relevance and trustworthiness of congressional findings. Closer
attention to these institutional questions would certainly improve the
Justices’ assessment of the facts themselves. It may also help them
with the legal analysis. After all, constitutional doctrine routinely
requires judges to engage with the facts against which the
government regulated.

388. See Bob Bauer, What to Do About the Court: Two Views, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD
L. (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/10/what-to-do-aboutthe-court-two-views/ (arguing that politicians who are convinced that money accounts of
certain legislative behavior are the “acknowledged experts” on questions of campaign
finance policy).
389. See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 13, at 910–22 (examining instances in which Congress’s
factual findings merit less deference).
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B. The Tone of the Court’s Determinations
1. Aporetic engagement
The problem with the Court’s treatment of facts in these cases is
a matter not just of content, but also of tone. To this extent, the
problem is partially one of judicial craft: the Justices are too willing
to steer around inconvenient evidence as they write their opinions. 390
Phrased somewhat differently, the Justices’ rejection of congressional
facts in these cases is part of a larger phenomenon in which they
write opinions to emphasize their strongest points and conceal
their weakest. 391
The Court’s quick dismissal of Congress’s facts speaks to a
broader penchant for refusing to take seriously arguments on the
other side of the litigation ledger. 392 As I have argued elsewhere, the
Court often writes its opinions to make hard cases sound much
easier than they in fact are. 393 That phenomenon helps explain the
problem here. If the Justices were more committed to conceding the
difficulty of the case at hand, they would be less inclined to brush
aside inconvenient facts. To this extent, a change in tone could also
yield a change in the facts with which the Court carefully engages.
As Professor Kahan has argued, the Court could cultivate a more
aporetic rhetoric. 394 “Aporia,” as he explains it, refers to a mode of
argumentative engagement that acknowledges, rather than dismisses,
complexity and competing evidence. 395 A Justice writing an opinion
in the aporetic mode can still render a binding decision in a case but
should acknowledge the other side’s strong arguments and facts. 396
More aporetic engagement would require the Court to discuss
carefully Congress’s policy goals and the factual landscape that
prompted legislative action in the first place. Similarly, this approach
would encourage the Court to examine closely how the decision
about whether to treat a challenge as facial or as-applied impacts the
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

See supra Section II.D.
See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 729.
See id. at 751–52.
See id. at 671–79.
See Kahan, supra note 252, at 62.
See id. at 62–63.
See id.
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universe of relevant facts. If Congress has, in fact, exceeded its
constitutional authority or violated an individual right, the Court
should invalidate the relevant statutory provision. The Court,
however, should not do so without honest consideration of the
problems Congress tried to address.
Of course, a statute’s constitutionality does not rest solely on
Congress’s belief it is addressing a grave societal mischief. That said,
the Court owes it to Congress to take seriously its worldview. More
aporetic engagement would encourage the Court to discuss
Congress’s findings carefully before deciding whether they were
legally irrelevant. While such engagement realistically may not
change the Justices’ minds often, it could force them to think more
consciously about the assumptions underlying their decision-making,
including their instincts about facts. 397
To this extent, a more aporetic rhetoric could operate as a
modest but important speed bump. The Justices’ enjoy vast
discretion in their exercise of judicial review, and ultimately it is up to
them to police the exercise of that discretion themselves. 398 But if the
Justices were to attempt a more aporetic rhetoric, they would be
more likely to force themselves to engage with inconvenient facts
and to justify more carefully their decision to treat a constitutional
challenge as facial or as-applied. We could not realistically
expect a sea change in judicial practices, but we could expect
some improvement.
2. Candor
Just as the Court could more honestly acknowledge strong
arguments on the other side, so too could it more candidly explain
the norms underlying the Justices’ decisions. A common thread
running through these decisions is that the five conservative Justices,
over the dissents of the four liberals, struck down parts of federal
legislation with minimal regard for what Congress was trying to do
and why. To be sure, the majority had plausible legal arguments on

397. See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 754.
398. Cf. Neal Devins, Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1495 (2017) (discussing lawmakers’ incentives to acquiesce to
judicial decisions).
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its side. In each case, however, there were also strong arguments for
why Congress’s factual findings should have mattered a great deal.
The Court’s rejection of Congress’s worldview ultimately had
less to do with the clear doctrinal requirements and more with
underlying normative principles. 399 As we have seen, constitutional
first principles in these cases trumped Congress’s policy-based facts.
Contrary to the majority’s insistence, the Constitution did not
require the outcome in any of these cases. Rather, the outcomes
were constitutionally plausible, and the majority of Justices’
normative preferences guided their decision-making.
It may be inevitable for norms to guide these kinds of
decisions. 400 Most judges cannot easily separate their own normative
views from their judicial decisions, especially in constitutional cases
where there are few clear rules limiting judges’ discretion. 401 That
said, judges could try to do a better job recognizing and
admitting the ways in which norms shape their own decisionmaking processes. 402
The opinions in these cases are written as though norms played
no role in the decision to jettison congressional findings. While it
may be difficult to adopt new practices, the Justices should
encourage themselves and each other to explain more candidly the
true reasons for their decisions. 403 Some Justices may believe that the
underlying norms are baked into our constitutional structure, but
their opinions would be stronger if they admitted that their preferred
constitutional principles are contestable. As Professor Powell puts it,
only if we “understand the true grounds of a decision can we assent
to its correctness or . . . to its validity as the outcome of our system
even though we think it wrong in substance.” 404

399. See supra Section II.A.
400. See supra notes 251–65 and accompanying text.
401. See POSNER, supra note 249, at 272 (“The Court is awash in an ocean
of discretion.”).
402. See id. at 289 (encouraging Justices to acknowledge “to themselves
the essentially personal, subjective, political, and . . . arbitrary character of most of their
constitutional decisions”).
403. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 120, at 673.
404. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 90 (2008).
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Judicial candor also can be a way of encouraging the Justices
themselves to become more aware of their own implicit biases.405
Indeed, part of the problem in these cases is that the majority
Justices confidently assumed that they were correct and failed to
question the premises underlying their decisions. 406 To this extent,
more transparency and candor might produce greater introspection
among some Justices. It is not clear that the Justices are themselves
aware of the extent to which their own factual assumptions and
underlying normative biases drive their legal or factual analyses, or
the extent to which this phenomenon may undermine their
credibility. Increased transparency might help the Justices more
readily identify their own biases.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s penchant for ignoring seemingly vital facts in
constitutional cases speaks to its considerable power to direct and
alter the shape of constitutional law. Shelby County, NFIB, and
Citizens United were each significant decisions with important
practical and legal implications. While the Justices’ opinions in each
case were fairly convincing on their own terms, they seem woefully
lacking in light of the facts the Justices refused to discuss.
This disregard of facts confuses constitutional doctrine,
aggrandizes the judiciary, disrespects Congress, and contributes to
the demise of facts in our society. To be sure, it is ultimately up to
the judiciary to determine which facts have constitutional salience.
But in these cases, the Court did not explain adequately why it
brushed aside these facts. Before deeming irrelevant facts that
prompted legislative action, the Court owes us all a more
careful explanation.
These issues get to the heart of the uneasy line between law and
politics in constitutional law. It is impossible for the Court to
separate politics from constitutional law completely. It is also nearly
impossible to always draw a clear distinction between law and fact, or
between facial and as-applied challenges. Greater attention to these
405. See Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing Strategies,
49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 373, 389–90 (2012).
406. See McAward, supra note 346, at 380.
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issues, however, would yield more careful, candid, thorough, and
convincing constitutional opinions.
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